Data source · OAK-DS-06 · on-chain

OAK-DS-06 — Token Mint and Burn Events

Layer: on-chain
Chains: EVM, Solana
Typical access path: ERC-20 Transfer events with from = 0x00...0 (mint) or to = 0x00...0 (burn); equivalent on Solana via mint-account state changes.

Description

Records changes to a token's total supply. Critical for OAK-T5.003 (Hidden-Mint Dilution) detection — both pre-event (presence of mint authority) and at-event (mint to deployer-clustered addresses).

What data

Mint events (transfer from null address); recipient, amount, timestamp.
Burn events (transfer to null address); source, amount, timestamp.
Total-supply trajectory derived from mint - burn over time.

Where defenders access it

Standard ERC-20 Transfer event subscription, filtered for null-address counterparty; Solana mint-account state via RPC getTokenSupply and account-data inspection.

Techniques that depend on this Data Source

OAK-T5.003 — Hidden-Mint Dilution (post-launch mint events).
OAK-T1.001 / T1.002 — Token Genesis (pre-launch presence of mint authority via DS-01).
OAK-T9.004 — Access-Control Misconfiguration (Wormhole case: mint-without-corresponding-lock invariant violation).

Maintainer notes

The "mint without corresponding lock" invariant — relevant at bridge wrapping contracts — is one of the highest-leverage real-time invariants a defender can monitor; a single violated DS-06 mint event paired with absence of the corresponding DS-10 lock event is an unambiguous T9.004 / T10.002 signal at runtime.