Worked example · 2013-12

GBL Bitcoin Exchange fraud / exit — 2013-10 to 2013-12

Loss

about $4.1 million (roughly 25 million yuan) in customer funds per press reports, with over 500 to 1,000+ affected users, mostly in mainland China; estimates vary widely ([slashdotgbl], [hnsgbl]). The earlier 9,640 BTC / ~$5M figure is unsourced. Global Bond Limited (GBL) was a Chinese Bitcoin exchange launched in May 2013; its site went offline on 2013-10-26 and its Hong Kong approval claim and offices proved bogus ([hnsgbl], [slashdotgbl]).

OAK Techniques observed

OAK-T11.005.001 (Fake-CEX / Pig-Butchering Platform — the GBL platform was a fake exchange with no real trading backend; balance displays were operator-controlled fictions). OAK-T6.001 (Source-Verification Mismatch — GBL's claimed corporate registration in Hong Kong was either fabricated or unverifiable). OAK-T5.001 (Hard LP Drain — the operator swept deposited BTC in a single-event exit when the scheme collapsed). OAK-T8.005 (Operational-Security Procedural Failure — the operator's registration / hosting / identity trail was insufficiently verified by depositors).

Attribution

pseudonymous in OAK's sense, but Chinese police detained three men in connection with GBL (surnamed Liu, Jin and Huang, aged 29, 24 and 33, per Xinhua as relayed by press); they reportedly denied wrongdoing, and the outcome is not established here ([hnsarrest]). The earlier statement that no arrest resulted was wrong.

Corrected 2026-10-11

Collapse was late October 2013 (not December), loss ~$4.1M (not 9,640 BTC / $5M), Chinese police did detain three suspects, and no cited source calls it a Ponzi scheme with 1-2% daily returns; those details are removed as unsourced.

Key teaching point

GBL is an early fake-approval Bitcoin exchange case: a mainland-China service claiming Hong Kong approval and offices that did not exist, which went dark in October 2013. The comparison to the T11.005.001 pig-butchering class and to JPEX is OAK's own analogy, not sourced here.