OAK — OnChain Attack Knowledge

Worked example · 2026-09

Flamincome — an $18M flash loan moved a vault's share price for one transaction, and redemption trusted it — Flamincome / EVM (chain not named in reporting; Morpho, Curve and aUSDT legs indicate Ethereum) — 2026-09-16

Loss
~$345,900 USDT.
OAK Techniques observed
OAK-T9.002 (Flash-Loan-Enabled Exploit — primary. The attacker borrowed ~$18M USDT via Morpho, staked Curve USDP LP tokens to inflate the share price of VaultYUSDT, and redeemed into aUSDT at the inflated rate, all inside one transaction. See techniques/T9.002-flash-loan-enabled-exploit.md). OAK-T9.001 (Oracle Price Manipulation — the vault's own share price was the manipulated reference; it is an internal oracle and failed as one).
Attribution
pseudonymous.
Key teaching point
A vault share price computed from current holdings is a spot price, and every lesson about spot prices applies to it. If a deposit can move the share price and a redemption in the same transaction reads it, the vault is an oracle with no TWAP and no deviation bound.

Summary

On 2026-09-16 an attacker flash-borrowed ~$18M USDT from Morpho, used it to stake Curve USDP LP tokens into Flamincome's VaultYUSDT and inflate its share price, redeemed into aUSDT at the inflated rate, and repaid the loan, netting ~$345,900.

Public references

Techniques demonstrated (2)