OAK — OnChain Attack Knowledge

Worked example · 2026-10

Gamdom — an unauthorised connection to an automation server, then hot wallets on four chains drained — Gamdom (crypto casino) / EVM chains, Solana, Tron, Bitcoin — 2026-10-13

Loss
just over $3M per founder Felix Romer; on-chain observers estimate ~$4.2M, broken down (per Arkham data cited by press) as ~$2.2M across EVM networks (Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism), ~$965K on Solana, ~$375K on Tron and ~$668K in Bitcoin. Gamdom says user funds are safe and moved the remaining hot-wallet funds to cold storage; the site was still offline on 2026-10-15.
OAK Techniques observed
OAK-T15.003 (Operator-Endpoint Compromise — entry, operator-stated. Gamdom first reported a suspected disk failure on a server, then said it had found an unauthorised connection to an automation server. How the connection was obtained is not disclosed. See techniques/T15.003-operator-endpoint-compromise.md). OAK-T11.011 (Multi-chain Key-store Co-location — inferred from the extraction pattern, as for Duelbits three weeks earlier: outflows from hot wallets on chains with unrelated signing schemes point to one signing layer reachable from one intrusion. See techniques/T11.011-multi-chain-key-store-co-location.md). Whether the server held keys or could request signatures is not disclosed.
Attribution
unattributed.
Key teaching point
An automation server that can move hot-wallet funds is a hot wallet. The second crypto casino in three weeks lost balances on four chains at once. Segregating signing per chain, and keeping automation behind per-transaction limits it cannot change itself, bounds what one intrusion can take.

Summary

On 2026-10-13 Gamdom took its site offline, initially citing a possible disk failure. On 2026-10-14 it said it had found an unauthorised connection to an automation server, and Romer described a breach of the hot-wallet system with losses of just over $3M. Observers saw unusual transfers from Gamdom hot-wallet addresses across several networks; reports say funds were swapped, bridged and routed through THORChain and Hyperliquid.

Root-cause evidence

  • Technique: OAK-T15.003
  • Source: https://x.com/gamdom/status/2110213246410227730
  • Source type: operator
  • Confidence: reported
  • Evidence: Gamdom states an unauthorised connection to an automation server preceded the hot-wallet drain; vector and key-handling are undisclosed. The T11.011 secondary is OAK's inference from simultaneous multi-chain outflows, not an operator finding.

Public references

Techniques demonstrated (2)