OAK — OnChain Attack Knowledge

Worked example · 2026-10

Qubic — wallet seeds generated with weak randomness on some browsers and iOS builds were derived, and 1,404 wallets emptied in under two hours — Qubic — 2026-10-17

Loss
~2.94 trillion QU (~$1.3–1.4M) from 1,404 wallets between 23:42 UTC on 2026-10-17 and 01:26 UTC on 2026-10-18. ~87.1% never left Qubic and is immobilised on-chain; the rest reached MEXC, which froze the receiving account. Network consensus approved returning the funds.
OAK Techniques observed
OAK-T11.004 (Insufficient-Entropy Key Generation — primary, operator-stated. Qubic traced the drain to weak, predictable seeds produced by its wallet software on certain browsers (Safari), legacy Apple devices and an older Qubic iOS app; the protocol itself was not at fault. Client 4.26.4 fixed seed generation. See techniques/T11.004-insufficient-entropy-key-generation.md).
Attribution
unattributed.
Key teaching point
Seed generation must fail closed on platforms without good randomness. Every wallet the weak path ever created is a standing liability until its owner moves funds.

Summary

Qubic halted the chain at tick 85,371,949, published an update on 2026-10-18 and restarted around 2026-10-20 with a claims process.

Timeline (UTC)

Read it as three stages. Flaw: some wallet software generated predictable seeds. Take: 1,404 wallets are emptied in 104 minutes. Contain: the chain is halted, most of the QU is stuck on-chain, an exchange freezes the rest. Sources give no addresses or transaction hashes.

When What happened OAK
Before 2026-10-17 (undisclosed; Qubic puts the earliest affected wallets at legacy Apple devices and early iOS app builds) Qubic's wallet software on certain browsers (Safari), legacy Apple devices and early iOS app builds generates weak, predictable seeds. Wallets created that way can be re-derived by anyone. The protocol itself is not at fault. T11.004
Before 2026-10-17 23:42 (undisclosed) How the attacker found and enumerated the weak seed space is not published. T11.004
2026-10-17 23:42 to 2026-10-18 01:26 An attacker drains 1,404 wallets, about 2.94 trillion QU (about $1.3M), in about 1 hour 44 minutes. T11.004
2026-10-18 (after 01:26) Validators stop the chain at tick 85,371,949, which locks the ledger. About 87.1% of the drained QU never left the network and is immobilised on-chain. response
2026-10-18 (within 1 hour of arrival) The other 12.9% reaches MEXC. MEXC freezes the receiving account within an hour on suspicion that it is linked to the attack. Bitget separately suspends QUBIC deposits and withdrawals. response
2026-10-18 Qubic ships client 4.26.4 to fix seed generation and says it secured further funds exposed to the same flaw before they could be taken. QEARN staking is unaffected. response
2026-10-18 12:29 Qubic publishes its security incident update. Whether victims are compensated is left to a vote of the Computor cluster; Crypto Briefing says affected users are advised to file police reports. Later restart and return steps are not covered by the sources fetched here. response

Root-cause evidence

Public references

Techniques demonstrated (1)