OAK — OnChain Attack Knowledge

Worked example · 2026-10

WAX Multi-Chain Bridge — a negative max_fee cancelled the debit while the full withdrawal was still paid out on Solana and Ethereum — WAX / Solana / Ethereum — 2026-10-22

Loss
~$90.5K (SlowMist).
OAK Techniques observed
OAK-T9.016 (Contract Accounting-State Invariant Flaw — primary. eth.token::withdraw on WAX did not enforce max_fee ≥ 0 before debiting quantity + max_fee. With max_fee = -quantity the debit was zero while the withdrawal amount stayed whole; the configured fee was zero, so the fee check was skipped. The bridge emitted withdrawal logs and paid out on Solana and Ethereum. See techniques/T9.016-contract-accounting-state-invariant-flaw.md). The cross-chain messaging itself worked; the source-side burn was wrong.
Attribution
pseudonymous (WAX fasdfas.al).
Key teaching point
Sign-check every amount that is added to a debit. A fee field is an amount.

Summary

SlowMist flagged the exploit on 2026-10-22.

Timeline (UTC)

Read it as three stages. Flaw: the WAX eth.token::withdraw action did not check the sign of max_fee. Take: withdrawals with a negative fee debit nothing, and the bridge pays out in full on Solana and Ethereum. Aftermath: nothing published beyond the alert. SlowMist's alert is the only source and it gives no transaction hashes.

When What happened OAK
Before 2026-10-22 (undisclosed) eth.token::withdraw on WAX debits quantity + max_fee without enforcing max_fee >= 0. The configured fee is zero, so the fee check is skipped. Since when the action was live in this form is not stated. T9.016 (flaw)
Before 2026-10-22 (undisclosed) The attacker uses the WAX account fasdfas.al, with receiving addresses on Solana (4H1piNZ8LsYhZGYhkbJDbPDSghxRj3HWxJqVz5dve8Q7) and Ethereum (0x01664E199991b2F3fe412c2DE5B9b7A0dcDc5070). Funding and testing are not published. —
2026-10-22 (undisclosed times) The attacker calls withdraw with max_fee = -quantity, so the debit is zero while the full withdrawal amount is kept. The bridge emits withdrawal logs, and corresponding payouts occur on Solana from the bridge account (8cqv3kRg1ivwPNrGGrvJANXb6RPik6XEhnBzs18tPcKC) and on Ethereum from the bridge contract (0x24b22B031Ae1B5a6b09F9a0FD33613a40e0d70e6). About $90.5K in total. T9.016
Undisclosed Where the withdrawn funds went afterward is not published. —
2026-10-22 15:23 SlowMist publishes the alert. No statement, pause or fix by WAX was found in the cited source. —

Key addresses:

Root-cause evidence

Public references

Techniques demonstrated (1)