OAK — OnChain Attack Knowledge

Worked example · 2026-10

Yapeswap — a governance contract with zero quorum passed a near-zero-vote proposal that handed over the factory's admin role — Yapeswap / Ethereum — 2026-10-25

Loss
~$21.9K (SlowMist).
OAK Techniques observed
OAK-T9.003 (Governance Attack — primary. WorkersUnion had zero quorum, so a proposal backed by ~0.000055% of voting power transferred YapeFactory's feeToSetter role to the attacker. The attacker installed a Registry whose latestVault() returned fake vaults while vaults() still listed the real ones; YapePair counted deposits diverted to the fake vaults as farming assets without receiving redeemable shares. See techniques/T9.003-governance-attack.md).
Attribution
pseudonymous (0x6e523866424220b3cb2cab88ba2195cfa5636b12).
Key teaching point
Quorum zero means any holder is the DAO. Abandoned or quiet governance contracts keep their powers; a minimum quorum and timelock cost nothing to keep.

Summary

SlowMist flagged the exploit on 2026-10-25.

Timeline (UTC)

Read it as three stages. Get in: a governance contract with zero quorum. Prepare: not published. Take: a proposal, then a fake vault registry. Times are from SlowMist's alert.

When What happened OAK
Before 2026-10-25 (undisclosed) WorkersUnion, Yapeswap's governance contract, has zero quorum, so any proposal that gets a vote passes. Since when is not published. T9.003
2026-10-25 (preparation undisclosed) Funding of the attacker address is not published. —
2026-10-25 (time undisclosed) A proposal backed by about 0.000055% of voting power passes and transfers YapeFactory's feeToSetter role to the attacker. T9.003
same sequence The attacker installs a Registry (contract 0x327bf6dfc38a79393f78866c705193c39b04be01) whose latestVault() returns fake vaults while vaults() still lists the real ones. T9.003
same sequence YapePair counts deposits diverted to the fake vaults as farming assets without receiving redeemable shares. Total loss about $21.9K. SlowMist's listed transaction: 0x4c741568cc12b23b382db409b0a38a4cfb6c708904f0c2ce7bad2e4fa7179e1e. T9.003
after the exploit (undisclosed) Where the proceeds went is not published. —
2026-10-25 09:36:49 SlowMist publishes its alert. response
after 2026-10-25 (undisclosed) No Yapeswap statement, pause or fix appears in the cited sources. response

Key addresses:

Root-cause evidence

Public references

Techniques demonstrated (1)