OAK — OnChain Attack Knowledge

Worked example · 2026-11

Across Protocol — social engineering of the domain registrar (Namecheap) handed an attacker across.to, which served a wallet-drainer frontend — Across / Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism, Ink, Plasma — 2026-11-10

Loss
~$350K per GoPlus (relayed by The Block: "total user losses are estimated at $350,000"), and ~$402K ($401,900) per Bitquery's own on-chain trace ("taken from 9 wallets on five chains between 19:02 and 21:53 UTC"). The two figures do not agree: Bitquery says the widely shared $294K matches the drainer-kit seller's fee wallet balance, and its v1 total was $348K before it found an ether sweep and raised it to $402K. Across did not publish a total; it said "All affected users will be made whole." Nothing is recorded as frozen or returned in the sources read.
OAK Techniques observed
OAK-T15.004 (Operator-Side Credential Compromise, registrar / DNS sub-shape — primary, operator-stated). Across: "a social engineering attack on @Namecheap (our domain registrar) gave a bad actor control of the Across domain." The pretext targeted the registrar's own staff or process, not Across personnel, and the control that would have stopped it sits at the registrar layer. See techniques/T15.004-operator-credential-compromise.md. OAK-T4.002 (Compromised Front-End Permit Solicitation — the hijacked domain served a phishing frontend that, per RektRadar, "prompted users to sign token approvals, Permit2 authorizations, or EIP-2612 permits"). See techniques/T4.002-compromised-frontend-permit-solicitation.md. OAK-T7.003 (Cross-Chain Bridge Laundering — Bitquery traces the thief's ETH through Relay, deBridge, LI.FI, Chainflip and THORChain). See techniques/T7.003-cross-chain-bridge-laundering.md.
Attribution
unattributed. No source names an actor. Bitquery tracks a thief wallet (0x2846e69d3298e99eddf2fd8116e952844da11fde) and a separate drainer-kit fee wallet (0x0c7c656126aa62625fdd8051eb69dc14aee8d37b); the kit is a rented service, so the seller and the operator of the hijack are different parties. Bitquery says the thief wallet "was busy only during the hijack", which is its inference.
Key teaching point
Put registrar-level change control on every domain that serves a wallet-connecting app: a registry lock, so that nameserver and record changes need an out-of-band confirmation the registrar's support staff cannot waive, plus alerts on any NS or A-record change. Across says its domain "was fully locked down with best-in-class security practices" and that the takeover "should not have been possible", so the weak point was the registrar's process, which the protocol could not inspect. Until that is shown to be closed, treat the registrar as part of your trust boundary and keep a fast path (SEAL 911, wallet blocklists, DNS provider) to take the domain out of service.

Unrelated prior incident: OAK already holds a different Across event, the July 2026 Solana relayer forgery of Anchor deposit events (examples/2026-07-across-solana-relayer-anchor-event-discriminator-forgery.md). That was an off-chain relayer verification flaw. This incident did not touch Across's contracts, relayers or API; the two share only the protocol name.

Summary

At about 18:45 UTC on 2026-11-10, per Across, a social engineering attack on its registrar Namecheap gave a bad actor control of across.to. For about three hours the domain led to a copy of the app that asked connecting wallets to sign approvals and permits. Across's first alert is dated 19:05:59 UTC. Across says it was alerted within 15 minutes of the attack, that SEAL 911 marked the site as phishing with major wallets, and that Cloudflare marked the domain at risk and later pulled its DNS records. It says no third-party integrations or API users were affected. Across also says Namecheap "has been unresponsive" while the domain was down. Across restored the domain at 01:16:45 UTC on 2026-11-11 with help from the Namecheap founder. Bitquery traced nine drained wallets from 19:02 to 21:53 UTC, an 80/20 split of each token drain between a thief wallet and a drainer-kit fee wallet, and a cash-out of the thief's ETH into Hyperliquid XMR1, Solana and Bitcoin. The registrar-side mechanism (which account, which staff process, which pretext) is undisclosed; Across promised a post-mortem.

Timeline (UTC)

Stages: Entry (registrar), Execution (phishing frontend and signatures), Money (split, consolidation, cash-out), Response. Times for Across's posts come from the fxtwitter API; drain and cash-out times are Bitquery's, except the rows marked "traced by OAK".

When What happened OAK
~2026-11-10 18:45 (Across's stated time; exact method undisclosed) Social engineering of Namecheap gives the attacker control of the across.to domain. Across: "a social engineering attack on @Namecheap (our domain registrar) gave a bad actor control of the Across domain." The registrar staff or process involved, and the pretext, are undisclosed. T15.004
2026-11-10 from ~18:45 across.to is pointed at a copy of the app that runs a wallet drainer. Per RektRadar it prompted signatures for "token approvals, Permit2 authorizations, or EIP-2612 permits"; per The Block, "fake token approvals or permits designed to drain wallets". Bitquery says the fake site asked for each chain where a wallet held money in turn. T4.002
2026-11-10 19:02 First drain in Bitquery's window (the window runs 19:02 to 21:53, nine wallets, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism). The first drain Bitquery found landed on Arbitrum. GoPlus lists Ink and Plasma as well; Bitquery has no transfer data for chains it does not cover. T4.002
2026-11-10 19:05:59 Across: "We're currently investigating an issue with the Across domain. Do NOT visit the app, connect your wallet, or sign any transaction or approval there until further notice." response
2026-11-10 19:56:59 Ether sweep, traced by OAK: 0xdd40b19abb1a00862aa443dc1d674b80c08a9b084094236bffce747243ad7f0e, an ERC-4337 handleOps bundle, moves 26.37531849 ETH from 0xdbd7fbe5b7cd56f99c059dc24052009d2626125c to the collector 0x3ef438c34ce51a697a24247fe033c4562c94f0fd. Bitquery: the collector kept 5% and passed the rest to payout address 0xa0e6c7d79b74d1a6d366dd11309b6faafda05ac5, which sent 20.95 ETH to the thief by 20:06. T4.002
2026-11-10 20:09:23 Aave pull, traced by OAK: 0x2610f11fd3cde7113f83e7137853972ba98d8360b3d91eed6d5807f947a8bd38 moves aWETH from the victim 0x42e7AB48D5ae0ED6941A89492D1c5Dfb06B8483c: 115.23141856629925 aWETH to the thief and 28.807854641574814 aWETH to the fee wallet (exactly 80/20). Bitquery: the depositor signed a permit and the pull was repeated in four steps over three minutes; it counts $304.5K for 148.60 aWETH, 76% of its total. T4.002
2026-11-10 20:11 to 20:17 Per Bitquery the thief swaps aWETH for ETH through UniswapX (20:11), brings tokens from the other chains to Ethereum via Relay and deBridge, and gathers ~$299K of ETH in a new splitting wallet. Traced by OAK, 20:17:59: 0x19c5460db37f5cc2bde6f8f644892a5348a1519d2aa97f720091e982134a8ae1 sends 146.26868582 ETH from the thief to the splitting wallet 0x38d7e8b3c9561caf096c06c62c7561f8ab6e514c. T7.003
2026-11-10 20:48 to 21:57 Per Bitquery the ETH leaves Ethereum by three routes: about $100K via LI.FI to Arbitrum and then USDC into Hyperliquid, bought as XMR1 (21:06, 21:31); about $100K into Chainflip at 21:11, arriving on Solana as SOL at 21:14, held about two and a half hours, then sent shortly before midnight in two parts to a Solana wallet Bitquery's labels mark as the Rainbet casino hot wallet (an inference; "No public record names it"); about $96K into THORChain at 20:51, paid out as 1.305 BTC at 22:36 to a new Bitcoin address, unspent when checked. T7.003
2026-11-10 21:37 to 22:13:54 SolanaFloor's $294K post (21:37, per Bitquery's chart). Across states the takeover time, the SEAL 911 and Cloudflare actions, and that the domain remains down because Namecheap "has been unresponsive". response
2026-11-11 01:16:45 Across: "Across is fully restored, and all systems are operational." The Namecheap founder helped secure the account and opened an investigation; "All affected users will be made whole"; a post-mortem is to follow. response

Key addresses:

Bitquery also lists a Solana "likely Rainbet deposit address" and a "Rainbet hot wallet, by our labels"; these are Bitquery's labels and are not reproduced as confirmed addresses here. The other seven victim wallets are given by Bitquery only in shortened form and are omitted rather than shortened.

Fund flow

Traced by OAK: the three Ethereum transactions above. Relayed from Bitquery ([bitquery2026]): the onward routes and amounts. Bitquery's balances were read on 11 November and "Later moves are not covered."

All transfers as a table (8)
Time (UTC)FromToAmountOAKTxBasis
2026-11-10T20:09:23ZAave depositor (largest victim)
0x42e7AB48D5ae0ED6941A89492D1c5Dfb06B8483c
Thief wallet
0x2846e69d3298e99eddf2fd8116e952844da11fde
115.2314 aWETHT4.0020x2610f11fd3cde7113f83e7137853972ba98d8360b3d91eed6d5807f947a8bd38traced by OAK
2026-11-10T20:09:23ZAave depositor (largest victim)
0x42e7AB48D5ae0ED6941A89492D1c5Dfb06B8483c
Drainer-kit fee wallet
0x0c7c656126aa62625fdd8051eb69dc14aee8d37b
28.8079 aWETHT4.0020x2610f11fd3cde7113f83e7137853972ba98d8360b3d91eed6d5807f947a8bd38traced by OAK
2026-11-10T19:56:59ZEther-sweep victim
0xdbd7fbe5b7cd56f99c059dc24052009d2626125c
Collector (5%)
0x3ef438c34ce51a697a24247fe033c4562c94f0fd
26.3753 ETHT4.0020xdd40b19abb1a00862aa443dc1d674b80c08a9b084094236bffce747243ad7f0etraced by OAK
2026-11-10T20:17:59ZThief wallet
0x2846e69d3298e99eddf2fd8116e952844da11fde
Splitting wallet
0x38d7e8b3c9561caf096c06c62c7561f8ab6e514c
146.2687 ETHT7.0030x19c5460db37f5cc2bde6f8f644892a5348a1519d2aa97f720091e982134a8ae1traced by OAK
2026-11-10T21:11:00ZSplitting wallet
0x38d7e8b3c9561caf096c06c62c7561f8ab6e514c
Chainflip48.81 ETHT7.003per bitquery2026
2026-11-10T20:51:00ZSplitting wallet
0x38d7e8b3c9561caf096c06c62c7561f8ab6e514c
THORChain47 ETHT7.003per bitquery2026
2026-11-10T21:14:00ZChainflipSolana wallet (1,197 SOL)
G47n6dbUor1WFweLvKPrUi5beW4yjRoFG3cJZU6a4uSa
1,197 SOLT7.003per bitquery2026
2026-11-10T22:36:00ZTHORChainBitcoin address (unspent)
3EQ9Rqrtvco4nKmskv2jQRXvWKkpUGfAQs
1.305 BTCT7.003per bitquery2026

Not drawn as edges: about $100K as XMR1 on the two Hyperliquid wallets above (Bitquery: "179.4 XMR1"; "still held XMR1 worth about $101K" early on 11 November), the Solana-to-casino step, about $35K still on Ethereum, and the 3.43 ETH sent at 01:20 UTC on 11 November. The 1,197 SOL is the amount Bitquery's address list gives for the Solana wallet; its route from the Chainflip step is Bitquery's reading.

Root-cause evidence

Public references

Techniques demonstrated (3)

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