Worked example · 2026-11
Across Protocol — social engineering of the domain registrar (Namecheap) handed an attacker across.to, which served a wallet-drainer frontend — Across / Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism, Ink, Plasma — 2026-11-10
Unrelated prior incident: OAK already holds a different Across event, the July 2026 Solana relayer forgery of Anchor deposit events (examples/2026-07-across-solana-relayer-anchor-event-discriminator-forgery.md). That was an off-chain relayer verification flaw. This incident did not touch Across's contracts, relayers or API; the two share only the protocol name.
Summary
At about 18:45 UTC on 2026-11-10, per Across, a social engineering attack on its registrar Namecheap gave a bad actor control of across.to. For about three hours the domain led to a copy of the app that asked connecting wallets to sign approvals and permits. Across's first alert is dated 19:05:59 UTC. Across says it was alerted within 15 minutes of the attack, that SEAL 911 marked the site as phishing with major wallets, and that Cloudflare marked the domain at risk and later pulled its DNS records. It says no third-party integrations or API users were affected. Across also says Namecheap "has been unresponsive" while the domain was down. Across restored the domain at 01:16:45 UTC on 2026-11-11 with help from the Namecheap founder. Bitquery traced nine drained wallets from 19:02 to 21:53 UTC, an 80/20 split of each token drain between a thief wallet and a drainer-kit fee wallet, and a cash-out of the thief's ETH into Hyperliquid XMR1, Solana and Bitcoin. The registrar-side mechanism (which account, which staff process, which pretext) is undisclosed; Across promised a post-mortem.
Timeline (UTC)
Stages: Entry (registrar), Execution (phishing frontend and signatures), Money (split, consolidation, cash-out), Response. Times for Across's posts come from the fxtwitter API; drain and cash-out times are Bitquery's, except the rows marked "traced by OAK".
| When | What happened | OAK |
|---|---|---|
| ~2026-11-10 18:45 (Across's stated time; exact method undisclosed) | Social engineering of Namecheap gives the attacker control of the across.to domain. Across: "a social engineering attack on @Namecheap (our domain registrar) gave a bad actor control of the Across domain." The registrar staff or process involved, and the pretext, are undisclosed. | T15.004 |
| 2026-11-10 from ~18:45 | across.to is pointed at a copy of the app that runs a wallet drainer. Per RektRadar it prompted signatures for "token approvals, Permit2 authorizations, or EIP-2612 permits"; per The Block, "fake token approvals or permits designed to drain wallets". Bitquery says the fake site asked for each chain where a wallet held money in turn. | T4.002 |
| 2026-11-10 19:02 | First drain in Bitquery's window (the window runs 19:02 to 21:53, nine wallets, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism). The first drain Bitquery found landed on Arbitrum. GoPlus lists Ink and Plasma as well; Bitquery has no transfer data for chains it does not cover. | T4.002 |
| 2026-11-10 19:05:59 | Across: "We're currently investigating an issue with the Across domain. Do NOT visit the app, connect your wallet, or sign any transaction or approval there until further notice." | response |
| 2026-11-10 19:56:59 | Ether sweep, traced by OAK: 0xdd40b19abb1a00862aa443dc1d674b80c08a9b084094236bffce747243ad7f0e, an ERC-4337 handleOps bundle, moves 26.37531849 ETH from 0xdbd7fbe5b7cd56f99c059dc24052009d2626125c to the collector 0x3ef438c34ce51a697a24247fe033c4562c94f0fd. Bitquery: the collector kept 5% and passed the rest to payout address 0xa0e6c7d79b74d1a6d366dd11309b6faafda05ac5, which sent 20.95 ETH to the thief by 20:06. |
T4.002 |
| 2026-11-10 20:09:23 | Aave pull, traced by OAK: 0x2610f11fd3cde7113f83e7137853972ba98d8360b3d91eed6d5807f947a8bd38 moves aWETH from the victim 0x42e7AB48D5ae0ED6941A89492D1c5Dfb06B8483c: 115.23141856629925 aWETH to the thief and 28.807854641574814 aWETH to the fee wallet (exactly 80/20). Bitquery: the depositor signed a permit and the pull was repeated in four steps over three minutes; it counts $304.5K for 148.60 aWETH, 76% of its total. |
T4.002 |
| 2026-11-10 20:11 to 20:17 | Per Bitquery the thief swaps aWETH for ETH through UniswapX (20:11), brings tokens from the other chains to Ethereum via Relay and deBridge, and gathers ~$299K of ETH in a new splitting wallet. Traced by OAK, 20:17:59: 0x19c5460db37f5cc2bde6f8f644892a5348a1519d2aa97f720091e982134a8ae1 sends 146.26868582 ETH from the thief to the splitting wallet 0x38d7e8b3c9561caf096c06c62c7561f8ab6e514c. |
T7.003 |
| 2026-11-10 20:48 to 21:57 | Per Bitquery the ETH leaves Ethereum by three routes: about $100K via LI.FI to Arbitrum and then USDC into Hyperliquid, bought as XMR1 (21:06, 21:31); about $100K into Chainflip at 21:11, arriving on Solana as SOL at 21:14, held about two and a half hours, then sent shortly before midnight in two parts to a Solana wallet Bitquery's labels mark as the Rainbet casino hot wallet (an inference; "No public record names it"); about $96K into THORChain at 20:51, paid out as 1.305 BTC at 22:36 to a new Bitcoin address, unspent when checked. | T7.003 |
| 2026-11-10 21:37 to 22:13:54 | SolanaFloor's $294K post (21:37, per Bitquery's chart). Across states the takeover time, the SEAL 911 and Cloudflare actions, and that the domain remains down because Namecheap "has been unresponsive". | response |
| 2026-11-11 01:16:45 | Across: "Across is fully restored, and all systems are operational." The Namecheap founder helped secure the account and opened an investigation; "All affected users will be made whole"; a post-mortem is to follow. | response |
Key addresses:
- Thief wallet (80% of each token drain; funded the splitting wallet) —
0x2846e69d3298e99eddf2fd8116e952844da11fde - Drainer-kit fee wallet (20% of each token drain; active since 25 September per Bitquery) —
0x0c7c656126aa62625fdd8051eb69dc14aee8d37b - Splitting wallet (received 146.27 ETH at 20:17) —
0x38d7e8b3c9561caf096c06c62c7561f8ab6e514c - Largest victim, Aave depositor (aWETH) —
0x42e7AB48D5ae0ED6941A89492D1c5Dfb06B8483c - Ether-sweep victim —
0xdbd7fbe5b7cd56f99c059dc24052009d2626125c - Ether-sweep collector (kept 5%) —
0x3ef438c34ce51a697a24247fe033c4562c94f0fd - Ether-sweep payout address (sent the thief 20.95 ETH) —
0xa0e6c7d79b74d1a6d366dd11309b6faafda05ac5 - Side wallet (holds 11.64 ETH per Bitquery) —
0xa490cde73adcd40475025ee8710f3a5ab7393194 - Sent ETH to the two Hyperliquid wallets —
0xf10a482fbc02195f2dafca5d9dfd19c871b0f4a5 - Sent ETH to Chainflip —
0x0f67a21780699bb5c5e6b5f986c0bab26bfffe5c - Hyperliquid wallets holding XMR1 —
0x09360fe2e18fdfa49beb7592b9f24f94c5465533and0xf229f808fe21911f8bcc24ebb30a85bd2e4c00f0 - Got 3.43 ETH from the thief at 01:20 UTC on 11 November —
0xbca05d20dbb271fd607e69fdc8d955be3bfc8120 - Solana wallet that got 1,197 SOL —
G47n6dbUor1WFweLvKPrUi5beW4yjRoFG3cJZU6a4uSa - Bitcoin address that got 1.305 BTC from THORChain, unspent when checked —
3EQ9Rqrtvco4nKmskv2jQRXvWKkpUGfAQs
Bitquery also lists a Solana "likely Rainbet deposit address" and a "Rainbet hot wallet, by our labels"; these are Bitquery's labels and are not reproduced as confirmed addresses here. The other seven victim wallets are given by Bitquery only in shortened form and are omitted rather than shortened.
Fund flow
Traced by OAK: the three Ethereum transactions above. Relayed from Bitquery ([bitquery2026]): the onward routes and amounts. Bitquery's balances were read on 11 November and "Later moves are not covered."
All transfers as a table (8)
Not drawn as edges: about $100K as XMR1 on the two Hyperliquid wallets above (Bitquery: "179.4 XMR1"; "still held XMR1 worth about $101K" early on 11 November), the Solana-to-casino step, about $35K still on Ethereum, and the 3.43 ETH sent at 01:20 UTC on 11 November. The 1,197 SOL is the amount Bitquery's address list gives for the Solana wallet; its route from the Chainflip step is Bitquery's reading.
Root-cause evidence
- Technique: OAK-T15.004 (primary); OAK-T4.002; OAK-T7.003
- Source: https://x.com/AcrossProtocol/status/2120278803318489362; https://x.com/AcrossProtocol/status/2120324818385912082; https://www.theblock.co/news/defi/2026-11-11-crosschain-protocol-across-restores-systems-after-domain-hijack-437843; https://www.rektradar.xyz/web3-daily-exploits-11-nov-2026-across-350k-domain-hijack/; https://bitquery.io/investigations/across-protocol-domain-hijack
- Source type: operator
- Confidence: confirmed
- Evidence: Confidence applies to the hijack and its entry point as the operator states them; the loss figures, the permit and Permit2 mechanics and the cash-out are only reported. Across states the entry point ("a social engineering attack on @Namecheap (our domain registrar) gave a bad actor control of the Across domain") and the response. That settles the vector at the operator level. Not established: who at Namecheap or which process was deceived, what the pretext was, and why a domain Across calls "fully locked down" could be moved; Across promised a post-mortem that OAK has not seen. The permit and Permit2 detail is from RektRadar (secondary) and The Block ("fake token approvals or permits"); Bitquery adds that the largest victim signed a permit on aWETH. Loss is disputed between GoPlus (~$350K) and Bitquery ($401,900). OAK traced three Ethereum transactions itself; Bitquery's onward routes and its labels (including the casino) are not independently re-traced.
Public references
[acrossalert2026]— Across (@AcrossProtocol), initial alert (2026-11-10 19:05:59 UTC): https://x.com/AcrossProtocol/status/2120231513459433747[acrossdetail2026]— Across (@AcrossProtocol), domain takeover statement (2026-11-10 22:13:54 UTC): https://x.com/AcrossProtocol/status/2120278803318489362[acrossrestored2026]— Across (@AcrossProtocol), restoration (2026-11-11 01:16:45 UTC): https://x.com/AcrossProtocol/status/2120324818385912082[theblock2026]— The Block, "Crosschain protocol Across restores systems after domain hijack" (2026-11-11): https://www.theblock.co/news/defi/2026-11-11-crosschain-protocol-across-restores-systems-after-domain-hijack-437843[rektradar20261111]— RektRadar (secondary), "Web3 daily exploits 11 Nov 2026: Across $350K domain hijack": https://www.rektradar.xyz/web3-daily-exploits-11-nov-2026-across-350k-domain-hijack/[bitquery2026]— Bitquery, "Across Protocol Domain Hijack: $402K Drained From 9 Wallets" (2026-11-10, on-chain figures verified 2026-11-12): https://bitquery.io/investigations/across-protocol-domain-hijack