OAK — OnChain Attack Knowledge

Worked example · 2026-11

Arcus — a bug in transfers between a user's own subaccounts let one new account record a balance far larger than it held, then withdraw 2,234,391 USDG — Arcus Labs / Arcus exchange (Robinhood Chain per Arcus FAQ; withdrawal chain undisclosed) — 2026-11-09

Loss
$2,234,391 (2,234,391 USDG), per the operator: "$2,234,391 USDG was withdrawn on-chain before withdrawals were stopped." A further $3M of requested withdrawals "was held by the bridge's on-chain rate limit, never paid out, and later reversed." The operator states: "The temporary shortfall has been fully covered by Arcus Labs from the company's treasury." No other user balances, positions or orders were affected (operator).
OAK Techniques observed
OAK-T9.016 (Contract Accounting / State-Invariant Flaw — primary, with a fit caveat). The operator says the exchange mishandled transfers between a user's own subaccounts and, "under specific conditions," recorded "a balance far larger than it actually held." The caller was entitled to the transfer; the bookkeeping, not an access check, was wrong, and the inflated balance was then withdrawn through the bridge. This is the same shape as OAK's Cypher 2023 case (sub-account accounting), see techniques/T9.016-contract-accounting-state-invariant-flaw.md. Caveat: T9.016 is defined for contract logic; Arcus calls the failing component "the exchange", and the report does not say whether the flawed ledger is on-chain or in an off-chain engine. OAK has no Technique for an off-chain exchange-ledger flaw; filed under T9.016 by mechanism (invariant: recorded balance ≤ held balance) pending a taxonomy decision. OAK-T7.003 (Cross-Chain Bridge Laundering) and OAK-T7.007 (DEX Aggregator Routing Laundering) describe only the on-chain hops traced by OAK (Relay inbound and THORChain; CoW Protocol swap), not a source statement. OAK-M11 (rate limit) is a mitigation that worked here, not a Technique.
Attribution
unattributed. Arcus names only "the initial address of the exploiter": 0xeFbf442599310E5CeE1A4EDd5c66334c5f30b3dd. It says it is "working with blockchain investigators and will coordinate with law enforcement as appropriate."
Key teaching point
A withdrawal must be checked against assets actually held, not against the ledger's own balance field. The only control that bounded this loss was the bridge's on-chain withdrawal rate limit: it held back $3M and capped the payout at $2.23M.

Summary

On 2026-11-09 at around 22:07 ET (03:07 UTC on 11-10), a newly created account used a bug in how Arcus handled transfers between a user's own subaccounts to record a balance far larger than it held, and requested withdrawals against it. Arcus's monitoring flagged the withdrawals at 22:15 ET; platform-wide withdrawals were paused at 23:07 ET and the fix was deployed at 23:37 ET. Arcus published its incident report on 2026-11-10. SlowMist's hacked-incident list records the same facts, classed as "Accounting Bug", and adds nothing independent.

Timeline (UTC)

Flaw, Take, Money, Response. Arcus gives all times "in ET from 11/09 to 11/10" without saying EST or EDT. OAK converts at UTC−5 (US daylight saving ended 2026-11-01, so 11-09 is EST). The report gives no transaction hashes for the Arcus-side events; rows below are Arcus's wording unless marked "traced by OAK".

When (UTC) What happened OAK
Before 2026-11-10 03:07 (undisclosed) Flaw in how the exchange handled transfers between a user's own subaccounts; since when it existed is undisclosed. T9.016
2026-11-10 03:07 (11-09 ~22:07 ET) "A newly created account exploited a bug" in those transfers; "under specific conditions" it recorded "a balance far larger than it actually held" and requested withdrawals against it. T9.016
2026-11-10 03:10 (22:10 ET) "The bridge's withdrawal rate limit automatically capped payouts and held back $3M of further requests." Withdrawn on-chain before the stop: 2,234,391 USDG. response (rate limit)
2026-11-10 03:15 (22:15 ET) "Monitoring flagged the withdrawals and the team began investigating." Same minute, traced by OAK: the exploiter's initial address on Ethereum first receives ETH, 47.12227876 ETH from 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef (03:15:59). Then 922.09779836 ETH from the RelayRouter contract in three transfers (03:18 to 03:55), e.g. 0xeee44e3ac0140a485eac9c5decc08c9b572f17a6489d5060bd4e1da968333d60. Total ETH received 03:15 to 03:59: 1,052.21268853. That this ETH is the USDG proceeds is OAK's inference from timing; the source chain of the Relay transfers was not resolved. —
2026-11-10 04:07 (23:07 ET) "Platform-wide withdrawals were paused and the status page was updated." response
2026-11-10 04:37 (23:37 ET) "The bug fix was deployed." response
2026-11-10 04:43 (23:43 ET) "The exploiter's addresses were blocked from trading, transferring, and withdrawing." response
2026-11-10 05:34 to 06:20 Traced by OAK: the address wraps 485.35329511 ETH to WETH in 13 transactions and sends 475.90173127 WETH to CoW Protocol's settlement contract in 11 transactions (first 0x64f1d899b5adf51d4d7c7e55d1a90cc13512db95b33fc8f0d3310456231986f9); it receives 1,008,945.40782694 DAI back. T7.007
2026-11-10 07:43 to 12:09 Traced by OAK: 52.50606734 ETH to the THORChain router in two depositWithExpiry calls (first 0x700862fe820db2534644fd19e457de6fdebd60a95bd292aa3dbe1d71301e2984). T7.003
2026-11-10 12:20 Traced by OAK: 47.79181168 ETH sent to an unlabelled address, 0xa91fe480c2062afb18df55ac6adfa0104633a3e2; a lookalike-address pattern (zero-value and fake-token transfers to similar-looking addresses) follows on this address, so later outflows are not traced. —
2026-11-10 09:26 (4:26 ET) "Platform-wide withdrawals were re-enabled." response
2026-11-10 10:02 (5:02 ET) "Pending withdrawals from the exploiter were reversed." response
2026-11-10 13:18 to 15:29 Traced by OAK: 1,008,945.41892694 DAI sent in 15 transfers to an unlabelled EOA, 0x9a30f6a596f3354ecb90d6bd3a2a16750dcf13d0. —
2026-11-10 17:28 (12:28 ET) "The shortfall was covered from the Arcus Labs company treasury." response

Key addresses:

Not found: the Arcus-side withdrawal transactions in USDG, the bridge contract address and the chain it runs on. Arcus's page names no chain or hash, and OAK has no Robinhood Chain explorer configured. The address's later activity (from 2026-11-12) is mostly address-poisoning noise and is not treated as exploiter movement.

Fund flow

All transfers as a table (9)
Time (UTC)FromToAmountOAKTxBasis
2026-11-10T03:18:35ZRelayRouter
0x0729e2a4716d9f7dd17858d5d504426d228697f7
Exploiter initial address (Arcus)
0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd
469.5695 ETHT7.0030xeee44e3ac0140a485eac9c5decc08c9b572f17a6489d5060bd4e1da968333d60traced by OAK
2026-11-10T03:26:23ZRelayRouter
0x0729e2a4716d9f7dd17858d5d504426d228697f7
Exploiter initial address (Arcus)
0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd
424.8708 ETHT7.0030x6496eac08e4bf885cdb73eed6928c8982f2ba3976edda0bbce1ecc357348cf10traced by OAK
2026-11-10T03:55:47ZRelayRouter
0x0729e2a4716d9f7dd17858d5d504426d228697f7
Exploiter initial address (Arcus)
0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd
27.6575 ETHT7.0030x9bf0e75e7beff0cbc3e2fe6b62418c759f2c555d176487b136ffdb60864c40d8traced by OAK
2026-11-10T03:15:59ZUnlabelled ETH source
0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef
Exploiter initial address (Arcus)
0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd
130.1149 ETH (×4)0x0d7ca983ccdf2a70733401429a6cf9d4c18ffaaa6591af2730ddc2937c62349etraced by OAK
2026-11-10T05:41:23ZExploiter initial address (Arcus)
0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd
CoW Protocol settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
475.9017 WETH (×11)T7.0070x64f1d899b5adf51d4d7c7e55d1a90cc13512db95b33fc8f0d3310456231986f9traced by OAK
2026-11-10T05:41:23ZCoW Protocol settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
Exploiter initial address (Arcus)
0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd
1,008,945.4078 DAI (×11)T7.0070x64f1d899b5adf51d4d7c7e55d1a90cc13512db95b33fc8f0d3310456231986f9traced by OAK
2026-11-10T07:43:23ZExploiter initial address (Arcus)
0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd
THORChain router
0xd37bbe5744d730a1d98d8dc97c42f0ca46ad7146
52.5061 ETH (×2)T7.0030x700862fe820db2534644fd19e457de6fdebd60a95bd292aa3dbe1d71301e2984traced by OAK
2026-11-10T12:20:35ZExploiter initial address (Arcus)
0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd
Unlabelled ETH recipient
0xa91fe480c2062afb18df55ac6adfa0104633a3e2
47.7918 ETH0x28145735a74e62b5e7480735391185f6f0b1625194bbbf6a5f82f38a96929349traced by OAK
2026-11-10T13:18:59ZExploiter initial address (Arcus)
0xefbf442599310e5cee1a4edd5c66334c5f30b3dd
DAI holding EOA
0x9a30f6a596f3354ecb90d6bd3a2a16750dcf13d0
1,008,945.4189 DAI (×15)0x119ec146add9a9a14f999e983da89070d1aea5df50c23c3c97f05e3e07067bd2traced by OAK

The flow starts at the exploiter's Ethereum address because that is the only on-chain anchor Arcus published. The USDG withdrawal itself and the hop that turned USDG into the ETH received here are not shown (chain and transactions undisclosed).

Root-cause evidence

  • Technique: OAK-T9.016
  • Source: https://arcus.xyz/blog/arcus-incident-report-november-9-2026; https://hacked.slowmist.io/
  • Source type: operator
  • Confidence: confirmed
  • Evidence: Confirmed at the level the operator discloses. Arcus: "a newly created account exploited a bug in how the exchange handled transfers between a user's own subaccounts"; "Under specific conditions, the bug let the account record a balance far larger than it actually held"; "The incident only involved a single account; no other accounts were affected"; the fix "was reviewed by our security partners, along with related checks across the codebase." Not disclosed: the exact conditions, whether the ledger is on-chain or off-chain, the withdrawal chain and transactions, and the bridge address. SlowMist's list repeats the operator's account ("Accounting Bug") and is not independent.

Public references

Techniques demonstrated (3)

More incidents