OAK — OnChain Attack Knowledge

Worked example · 2026-11

Chain Games — delegation share transfers did not sync reward checkpoints, so fresh recipient contracts re-claimed historical rewards and inflated 1,000 CHAIN into 36M+ shares — CHAIN delegation staking / Polygon PoS — 2026-11-15

Loss
~$20K (about 37.98 million CHAIN per the operator; 36,007,148 CHAIN in the one transaction DefimonAlerts and OAK's trace show; ~$20K per SlowMist and DefimonAlerts). The operator says stakers were to be made whole from a pre-attack snapshot; the amount actually refunded is undisclosed.
OAK Techniques observed
OAK-T9.016 (Contract Accounting-State Invariant Flaw — primary, per SlowMist). When delegation shares were transferred, the staking contract did not synchronise the reward checkpoint, so a newly created recipient contract could repeatedly claim historical rewards through restake(). SlowMist says the attacker used this across 360 cycles to turn 1,000 CHAIN of initial shares into over 36M shares, then redeemed them through the normal withdrawal process. See techniques/T9.016-contract-accounting-state-invariant-flaw.md.
Attribution
pseudonymous (attacker EOA 0x571d0ec17d84fdee89f5c9cf6b2fd930205e776f). The operator's statement says "attackers using AI toolsets"; that is the operator's characterisation and OAK has no independent evidence for it.
Key teaching point
A share transfer must settle reward checkpoints for both sender and recipient before balances move. Every caller was entitled to call restake(); the books were wrong because the transfer left the recipient's reward baseline at zero, so the same history could be claimed again by each fresh recipient.

Summary

Chain Games runs older CHAIN delegation staking contracts on Polygon, built on a Polygon ValidatorShare-style design (DefimonAlerts). On 2026-11-15 an attacker contract used delegation-share transfers to fresh recipient contracts and repeated restake() claims of historical rewards, inflating a 1,000 CHAIN position into over 36M shares (SlowMist). The shares were redeemed through the normal unbonding and withdrawal path, and the escrow paid 36,007,148 CHAIN to the attack contract in one transaction. OAK's trace shows that CHAIN sold into a Polygon pool for 20,345.506936 USDC within about a minute. The operator disabled delegation, snapshotted positions and said stakers would be made whole. DefimonAlerts (08:03 UTC) and SlowMist (10:13 UTC) published on 2026-11-16.

The figures do not match exactly. The operator says "about 37.98 million CHAIN" over a 03:23–04:38 UTC window. The one transaction named by SlowMist and DefimonAlerts moves 36,007,148 CHAIN. The remaining ~1.97M CHAIN is not explained by any source; OAK found no second transaction because the attacker's CHAIN activity was not fully traced. The operator's window may cover further transactions.

Timeline (UTC)

Flaw (older delegation contracts), Take (inflate and withdraw), Money (sale to USDC, onward move), Response. Times of on-chain events are block times from OAK's lookup; alert times are post timestamps.

When What happened OAK
Before 2026-11-15 (deployment date undisclosed) The older CHAIN delegation staking contract, ValidatorShare 0x4b197ce70af7faece9544ef29b76c1cccd54d7ac, does not synchronise reward checkpoints on share transfers, so a new recipient can claim historical rewards through restake() (SlowMist). T9.016
2026-11-15 03:22:47 to 03:26:16 Start of the window the operator gives: "between 03:23 and 04:38 UTC". On-chain the attacker EOA wraps about 61 POL twice and swaps WPOL for about 4.9 USDC each time, then sends about 4.8 USDC to the CHAIN/USDC pool 0xa4e9cff312f719bf663cd88d2118aaa16a0b574f (e.g. 0x4a2e284a8fb6e267fcd5feb086e781e69672903ca9618a7c216252e3dd158651); OAK reads these as test or setup transactions, an inference. Funding source and contract deployment are undisclosed. —
2026-11-15 03:34:05 Transaction 0x3705970a2eb947041640522d36d34822fc6a0eed3d0a9f05fff986da273019b4, sent by the attacker EOA to contract 0xc11dce2b74ce1717909c4c8d95e32b4cec5691fe. Per SlowMist, 360 restake cycles inflate 1,000 CHAIN of shares to over 36M. The escrow 0x1cb1f66bde215161d4b6598ddc2defbbc009c5a4 pays 36,007,148.3345035 CHAIN to the attack contract (traced by OAK). T9.016
2026-11-15 03:34:56 In 0x9ed1da6f3418b03b6a241e01592c8f006a33123fe565aaa00398f5208cfeb6ca the attack contract sends 36,008,148.3345035 CHAIN to pool 0xa4e9cff312f719bf663cd88d2118aaa16a0b574f and receives 20,345.506936 USDC, which goes to the attacker EOA (traced by OAK). The sold amount is 1,000 CHAIN above the escrow payout; OAK reads this as the attacker's own initial 1,000 CHAIN, an inference. —
2026-11-15 03:37:55 The attacker EOA sends 20,345.698838 USDC in 0x7cd661e0386a8496043caf6476325d571101c2d1548b9b2bfd06a526eea69f93 to 0x7944159f31a130ded2794052bbc7c4fdcf9c20e7, followed at 03:38:55 by 100 POL (0x8757627216ef667659593b4eb3486e509c3842b2a74d5df956b1b67a7388248a). —
2026-11-15 03:40:17 0x7944159f31a130ded2794052bbc7c4fdcf9c20e7 forwards 20,345.698838 USDC to 0x69460570c93f9de5e2edbc3052bf10125f0ca22d in 0x3593da5e6c222c801b8d2cd7f7e86dd93fe0a40cfa8ee630e3caf40e1bdf47c9. Movement after this is not traced by OAK. —
2026-11-15 03:39:43 and 03:50:08 The attacker EOA receives 0.000203 USDC dust from 0x794fa7f8ed693aa908d512c34b1f9d4c589c20e7 and 0x7944e92ed9191a6f6107ac84f7c091f8b2a320e7, whose first and last characters imitate the recipient above (address-poisoning pattern; OAK's observation, source of the dust undisclosed). —
2026-11-15 04:38 End of the operator's attack window. —
2026-11-15 21:34 Per RektRadar's reading of the operator statement, delegation is disabled for all validators; a pre-attack snapshot is taken at Polygon block 97338356. response
2026-11-15 23:39:44 The operator posts "CHAIN Polygon Staking Exploit" on X. response
2026-11-16 08:03 and 10:13 DefimonAlerts and SlowMist publish loss and root cause. response

Key addresses:

Fund flow

All transfers as a table (6)

Root-cause evidence

Public references

Techniques demonstrated (1)

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