Worked example · 2026-11
Lighter — a trader's API signing keys recovered from public signatures, then moved through a self-made public pool and withdrawn — Lighter / Ethereum — 2026-11-16
Summary
On 2026-11-16 a withdrawal of 10,393,056.789298 USDC left Lighter's Ethereum contract for 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387 at 10:11:47 UTC. Lighter first said at 11:02:33 UTC that the incident "appears to involve a single compromised external party" and suspended withdrawals and pool creation. At 12:49:09 UTC it said the cause was "a leaked API key for a specific trader's account" and that the protocol and smart contracts were unaffected. Its post-mortem (18:20 UTC) says the affected accounts' signing code reused nonces, so the attacker computed the API keys from public signatures without any access to the accounts or to Lighter's systems. The attacker then created a public pool from the account, minted shares in an attacker-controlled account, transferred the victim's funds into the pool without minting shares for the victim, redeemed and withdrew. The USDC was swapped for ETH on CoW Settlement within minutes.
Timeline (UTC)
Flaw (nonce reuse in unofficial signing code) → Take (key recovery, pool route, withdrawal) → Money (CoW swaps, ETH transfers) → Response (pause, Guardian, return, fixes). Times are from chain data (Blockscout, traced by OAK) and from Lighter's posts.
| When | What happened | OAK |
|---|---|---|
| Before 2026-11-16 (undisclosed) | The affected accounts' signing code, not the official Lighter SDKs, reused signing nonces; their signatures were public, so the API keys could be computed. Date of first reuse undisclosed | T11.004 |
| 2026-11-16, before 10:11 (undisclosed) | Attacker computes the API keys, creates a public pool from the affected account, mints shares in an attacker-controlled account, transfers the victim's funds into the pool and redeems. Times of these off-chain Lighter actions undisclosed | T11.004 |
| 2026-11-16 06:44-09:35 | Attacker wallet receives small ETH amounts and 10,525.840384 USDC (0xe6b8e54bb04420c42b20062d6941813f02b7e09556c44cc6e27bf6abcd78ca07); purpose undisclosed |
— |
| 2026-11-16 10:11:47 | 0x5b6f27ded0e9a66ef6fa107083e28db9914e46d7635cc5112d760b9cb2f958c9: the attacker wallet calls withdrawPendingBalance on the Lighter proxy and receives 10,393,056.789298 USDC |
T11.004 |
| 2026-11-16 10:13:23-10:46:23 | USDC sold on CoW Settlement for ETH/WETH in six transactions, for ~5,764.47 ETH in total (first: 0x0c4792dc149b597582f4fd05a7941303e1293d3821f2787aded600ae33179cb6) |
T7.002 |
| 2026-11-16 10:19:59 onward | ETH sent out in 160 ETH steps to many addresses, one example 0xdedaf598b2f9a1c91377222acc50b3b62191eb02c8d1b16f6fd36003291345e0. RektRadar and GoPlus report part going through LI.FI to Hyperliquid accounts that bought XMR1; OAK did not verify the bridge leg |
T7.001 |
| 2026-11-16 11:02:33 | Lighter: "a single compromised external party"; withdrawals and pool creation suspended | response |
| 2026-11-16 12:49:09 | Lighter: cause "a leaked API key for a specific trader's account"; Guardian mode enabled; Security Council upgrade to recover funds from "an additional withdrawal attempt"; attacker wallet named | response |
| 2026-11-16 18:20-18:21 | Post-mortem published; Guardian mode deactivated by the Security Council; deposits and withdrawals back to normal; ~5MM USDC returned to the affected trader | response |
Key addresses:
- Attacker-associated wallet (named by Lighter) —
0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387 - Lighter ZkLighter proxy (withdrawal source, per Blockscout label) —
0x3b4d794a66304f130a4db8f2551b0070dfcf5ca7 - CoW Settlement contract (swap counterparty) —
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41 - Account 714710 on-chain address (per GoPlus) —
0x0d1D09312665D31Ed68231b88079a245E0458F6F - Account 714723 on-chain address (per GoPlus) —
0x66Cf2f85115CC20bF439720927C1f93De9672068
Fund flow
Ethereum leg traced by OAK with tools/explorer.py (Blockscout, keyless) on 2026-11-17. The 160 ETH step is one of many identical transfers from the attacker wallet to different addresses; only the first is drawn. Counterfeit-name token transfers from lookalike addresses in the same wallet's history were excluded. The Hyperliquid/XMR1 leg is relayed by GoPlus and RektRadar and is not drawn.
All transfers as a table (14)
Root-cause evidence
- Technique: OAK-T11.004 (nearest fit; see Techniques above)
- Source: https://x.com/Lighter_xyz/status/2122311006604984497; https://x.com/Lighter_xyz/status/2122394446343946717; https://x.com/GoPlusSecurity/status/2122520900046319815; https://www.rektradar.xyz/web3-daily-exploits-17-nov-2026-lighter-10-4m-nonce/
- Source type: operator
- Confidence: confirmed
- Evidence: Lighter's 12:49 UTC post says "a leaked API key for a specific trader's account". Its post-mortem article "Signing Safely on Lighter" says "The API keys leaked through the accounts' own signatures", that the code "reused signing nonces", and lists the four-step pool route. GoPlus and RektRadar repeat the nonce-reuse mechanism independently of how Lighter wrote it, but they derive from Lighter's account. Not stated by any source: when the nonces were reused, which signing code the traders ran, and the exact times of the pool actions. The ~$15.48M two-account figure is GoPlus's and is unconfirmed by Lighter.
Mitigations
- Wallet signature for fund movement into public pools (enforced in Lighter's contract/sequencer rules, not in the API-key holder's code): an API key alone can no longer transfer funds into a public pool. This breaks the step that converted the recovered key into a withdrawable balance in this incident.
- Non-public API signatures, IP allowlists, per-key permissions and limits, nonce-reuse monitoring and voiding affected keys: stated by Lighter as done or in progress; enforced server-side so a leaked key cannot switch them off.
- Guardian mode: the contract Guardian paused withdrawals on the anomaly, and Lighter says that allowed ~5MM USDC to be returned by the Security Council.
Open questions
- No OAK Technique covers ECDSA/EdDSA signing-nonce reuse that exposes a private key from public signatures; T11.004 is the nearest and is a partial fit. Propose a Technique under T11 in
TAXONOMY-GAPS.md. - Lighter has not stated the number of affected accounts or the final realized loss.
- Which tx returned the ~5MM USDC, and what the "additional withdrawal attempt" was, are undisclosed.
Public references
[lighterupdate2026]— Lighter (@Lighter_xyz), update (2026-11-16): https://x.com/Lighter_xyz/status/2122311006604984497[lighterfirst2026]— Lighter (@Lighter_xyz), first notice (2026-11-16): https://x.com/Lighter_xyz/status/2122284181422284986[lighterpostmortem2026]— Lighter, "Signing Safely on Lighter: Lessons from November 16" (2026-11-16): https://x.com/Lighter_xyz/status/2122394446343946717[lighterreopen2026]— Lighter (@Lighter_xyz), withdrawals resumed (2026-11-16): https://x.com/Lighter_xyz/status/2122394646164758654[goplus2026]— GoPlus Security, "Lighter Incident Breakdown" (2026-11-17): https://x.com/GoPlusSecurity/status/2122520900046319815[rektradar2026]— RektRadar, "Web3 Daily Exploits 17 Nov 2026" (2026-11-17): https://www.rektradar.xyz/web3-daily-exploits-17-nov-2026-lighter-10-4m-nonce/