OAK — OnChain Attack Knowledge

Worked example · 2026-11

Lighter — a trader's API signing keys recovered from public signatures, then moved through a self-made public pool and withdrawn — Lighter / Ethereum — 2026-11-16

Loss
~$10.39M (10,393,056.789298 USDC withdrawn from the Lighter contract on Ethereum, traced by OAK; Lighter's own figure is undisclosed). Lighter says ~5MM USDC was returned to the affected trader by the Lighter Security Council. GoPlus reports ~$15.48M affected across two accounts (714710 and 714723); Lighter has not confirmed that figure.
OAK Techniques observed
OAK-T11.004 (Insufficient-Entropy Key Generation, nearest existing fit, partial: primary). Lighter's post-mortem says the affected accounts ran signing code other than the official SDKs that reused signing nonces, so the API private keys were computable from public signatures. This is a weak-randomness key-recovery failure, but at signing time, not at key generation, so T11.004 does not describe it exactly. No Technique covers nonce-reuse key recovery from public signatures; a gap is proposed in the open questions below. See techniques/T11.004-insufficient-entropy-key-generation.md. OAK-T7.002 (swap to ETH on CoW Settlement) and OAK-T7.001 (onward 160 ETH transfers) for the money.
Attribution
unattributed (Lighter named 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387 as "the wallet believed to be associated with the attacker, which has also been flagged by the community"; GoPlus reports it as Lighter account 769455).
Key teaching point
A key that signs trades must not also be able to move the whole balance into a pool the same key controls. Lighter's fix, a wallet signature for transfers into public pools, breaks the step that turned a leaked API key into a withdrawal. Signatures that expose key material when a nonce repeats should not be public in the first place.

Summary

On 2026-11-16 a withdrawal of 10,393,056.789298 USDC left Lighter's Ethereum contract for 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387 at 10:11:47 UTC. Lighter first said at 11:02:33 UTC that the incident "appears to involve a single compromised external party" and suspended withdrawals and pool creation. At 12:49:09 UTC it said the cause was "a leaked API key for a specific trader's account" and that the protocol and smart contracts were unaffected. Its post-mortem (18:20 UTC) says the affected accounts' signing code reused nonces, so the attacker computed the API keys from public signatures without any access to the accounts or to Lighter's systems. The attacker then created a public pool from the account, minted shares in an attacker-controlled account, transferred the victim's funds into the pool without minting shares for the victim, redeemed and withdrew. The USDC was swapped for ETH on CoW Settlement within minutes.

Timeline (UTC)

Flaw (nonce reuse in unofficial signing code) → Take (key recovery, pool route, withdrawal) → Money (CoW swaps, ETH transfers) → Response (pause, Guardian, return, fixes). Times are from chain data (Blockscout, traced by OAK) and from Lighter's posts.

When What happened OAK
Before 2026-11-16 (undisclosed) The affected accounts' signing code, not the official Lighter SDKs, reused signing nonces; their signatures were public, so the API keys could be computed. Date of first reuse undisclosed T11.004
2026-11-16, before 10:11 (undisclosed) Attacker computes the API keys, creates a public pool from the affected account, mints shares in an attacker-controlled account, transfers the victim's funds into the pool and redeems. Times of these off-chain Lighter actions undisclosed T11.004
2026-11-16 06:44-09:35 Attacker wallet receives small ETH amounts and 10,525.840384 USDC (0xe6b8e54bb04420c42b20062d6941813f02b7e09556c44cc6e27bf6abcd78ca07); purpose undisclosed —
2026-11-16 10:11:47 0x5b6f27ded0e9a66ef6fa107083e28db9914e46d7635cc5112d760b9cb2f958c9: the attacker wallet calls withdrawPendingBalance on the Lighter proxy and receives 10,393,056.789298 USDC T11.004
2026-11-16 10:13:23-10:46:23 USDC sold on CoW Settlement for ETH/WETH in six transactions, for ~5,764.47 ETH in total (first: 0x0c4792dc149b597582f4fd05a7941303e1293d3821f2787aded600ae33179cb6) T7.002
2026-11-16 10:19:59 onward ETH sent out in 160 ETH steps to many addresses, one example 0xdedaf598b2f9a1c91377222acc50b3b62191eb02c8d1b16f6fd36003291345e0. RektRadar and GoPlus report part going through LI.FI to Hyperliquid accounts that bought XMR1; OAK did not verify the bridge leg T7.001
2026-11-16 11:02:33 Lighter: "a single compromised external party"; withdrawals and pool creation suspended response
2026-11-16 12:49:09 Lighter: cause "a leaked API key for a specific trader's account"; Guardian mode enabled; Security Council upgrade to recover funds from "an additional withdrawal attempt"; attacker wallet named response
2026-11-16 18:20-18:21 Post-mortem published; Guardian mode deactivated by the Security Council; deposits and withdrawals back to normal; ~5MM USDC returned to the affected trader response

Key addresses:

Fund flow

Ethereum leg traced by OAK with tools/explorer.py (Blockscout, keyless) on 2026-11-17. The 160 ETH step is one of many identical transfers from the attacker wallet to different addresses; only the first is drawn. Counterfeit-name token transfers from lookalike addresses in the same wallet's history were excluded. The Hyperliquid/XMR1 leg is relayed by GoPlus and RektRadar and is not drawn.

All transfers as a table (14)
Time (UTC)FromToAmountOAKTxBasis
2026-11-16T10:11:47ZLighter ZkLighter proxy
0x3b4d794a66304f130a4db8f2551b0070dfcf5ca7
Attacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
10,393,056.7893 USDCT11.0040x5b6f27ded0e9a66ef6fa107083e28db9914e46d7635cc5112d760b9cb2f958c9traced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:13:23ZAttacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
CoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
1,000,000 USDCT7.0020x0c4792dc149b597582f4fd05a7941303e1293d3821f2787aded600ae33179cb6traced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:13:23ZCoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
Attacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
555.708 ETHT7.0020x0c4792dc149b597582f4fd05a7941303e1293d3821f2787aded600ae33179cb6traced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:14:23ZAttacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
CoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
2,000,000 USDCT7.0020x3b0c442b8826dc2dc940b9e5695d078332f3b3ac90c373aa99be20b2852b3d5btraced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:14:23ZCoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
Attacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
1,111.2617 ETHT7.0020x3b0c442b8826dc2dc940b9e5695d078332f3b3ac90c373aa99be20b2852b3d5btraced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:15:11ZAttacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
CoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
5,000,000 USDCT7.0020x2a5f6efd130af6900596069b4a48c74c0e1b1dc5742577482e42c59a590060d2traced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:15:11ZCoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
Attacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
2,775.3668 ETHT7.0020x2a5f6efd130af6900596069b4a48c74c0e1b1dc5742577482e42c59a590060d2traced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:17:23ZAttacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
CoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
360,000 USDCT7.0020xc3f01db1cccc9e2c446e2e583ab2497d3f7628a0d9e1964126a877e9b1fdf200traced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:17:23ZCoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
Attacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
199.8654 ETHT7.0020xc3f01db1cccc9e2c446e2e583ab2497d3f7628a0d9e1964126a877e9b1fdf200traced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:46:23ZAttacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
CoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
23,182.6297 USDCT7.0020x0e22e5c723e4f6384d1f815eece9cf84a6e44da69b8e8092fa003d1528cd2958traced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:46:23ZCoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
Attacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
12.8361 ETHT7.0020x0e22e5c723e4f6384d1f815eece9cf84a6e44da69b8e8092fa003d1528cd2958traced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:16:11ZAttacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
CoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
2,000,000 USDCT7.0020x2470732faf5b293e62f77cd7c4167733c9f6a097c1f4ec8e8b495bd12373fffdtraced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:16:11ZCoW Settlement
0x9008d19f58aabd9ed0d60971565aa8510560ab41
Attacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
1,109.4322 WETHT7.0020x2470732faf5b293e62f77cd7c4167733c9f6a097c1f4ec8e8b495bd12373fffdtraced by OAK
2026-11-16T10:19:59ZAttacker-associated wallet
0xb3fffca23d4444ee73349825acd84f7b5020e387
First 160 ETH recipient
0x63d09d9bd23c3ed507771db8bdd65bf557fe968c
160 ETHT7.0010xdedaf598b2f9a1c91377222acc50b3b62191eb02c8d1b16f6fd36003291345e0traced by OAK

Root-cause evidence

Mitigations

  • Wallet signature for fund movement into public pools (enforced in Lighter's contract/sequencer rules, not in the API-key holder's code): an API key alone can no longer transfer funds into a public pool. This breaks the step that converted the recovered key into a withdrawable balance in this incident.
  • Non-public API signatures, IP allowlists, per-key permissions and limits, nonce-reuse monitoring and voiding affected keys: stated by Lighter as done or in progress; enforced server-side so a leaked key cannot switch them off.
  • Guardian mode: the contract Guardian paused withdrawals on the anomaly, and Lighter says that allowed ~5MM USDC to be returned by the Security Council.

Open questions

  • No OAK Technique covers ECDSA/EdDSA signing-nonce reuse that exposes a private key from public signatures; T11.004 is the nearest and is a partial fit. Propose a Technique under T11 in TAXONOMY-GAPS.md.
  • Lighter has not stated the number of affected accounts or the final realized loss.
  • Which tx returned the ~5MM USDC, and what the "additional withdrawal attempt" was, are undisclosed.

Public references

Techniques demonstrated (3)

More incidents