Worked example · 2026-11
Pennysia — Settlement V1 arbitrary external call spent users' leftover token approvals — Pennysia Settlement V1 / Ethereum — 2026-11-12
Summary
On 2026-11-12 at 13:59:11 UTC an attacker contract 0x96Bb89E3F86312968cE11A1bD8d9d28F4891a17A was called from 0x813A5aB666AdeBa907548235fbAc087642878300 in block 26399314 (0x2716c50e450272240f68f2827bcb4a336c2ac520951e0e530154566c295b732d). The transaction made the Pennysia Settlement contract 0x3Aad97E5a91b8e43b7Dc830aCEb004307678795E execute transferFrom on four holders' leftover approvals and forward the tokens to the attack contract, which sent them to the attacker EOA. SlowMist reported after user reports of stolen funds and told anyone who had approved tokens to the Settlement contract to revoke. The mechanism is SlowMist's description of an "arbitrary external call"; the exact function and calldata were not published and OAK did not decode them.
Timeline (UTC)
Stages: Flaw (Settlement V1 deployed and used) → Preparation (attacker funded) → Take (one transaction) → Money (USDC and wstETH moved within about a minute) → Response. Times are block timestamps traced by OAK.
| When | What happened | OAK |
|---|---|---|
| Before 2026-10-26 (undisclosed) | Settlement V1 0x3Aad97E5a91b8e43b7Dc830aCEb004307678795E (verified as PennysiaSettlement, deployed by 0xDa70eC0779aB1904B7eb6C32f308B1a1C163fCB8) is live and users call executeSwap against it, e.g. from 2026-10-26, leaving approvals open. The exploitable external call existed from deployment or a later change; undisclosed. |
T9.004 |
| 2026-11-12 13:37:35 to 13:38:35 | The attacker EOA receives three small ETH transfers from three different addresses (about 0.0029, 0.0043 and 0.0058 ETH) to pay gas. The senders are not identified. | — |
| 2026-11-12 13:59:11 | 0x2716c50e450272240f68f2827bcb4a336c2ac520951e0e530154566c295b732d: the attacker calls the attack contract, which makes the Settlement contract spend approvals of four holders: 0xF2Ff84D45783BD64913903516FA44B419F266998 (5,000 USDC), 0x61081de92Ad52c786719537D84a4534A398bf76a (6.133489 USDC), 0x56EbC608fD6B8F8CeF2775a3Ee0DddaEc01A7000 (0.05 wstETH) and 0x40A86E910AB2E709cb552f6F8A979bc90D669497 (101,000 YUNO). Each token goes victim → Settlement → attack contract → attacker. |
T9.004, T4.004 |
| 2026-11-12 13:59:47 | 0x523f691f946ca7aa9f15999c2b828d2bde678241b303ca17a95df26365ea56e3: the attacker sends all 5,006.133489 USDC to 0xd492f207c2C2520Dcb13eD04AfA81aAae66C9378, an EOA. On 2026-11-13 22:08:35 that address sends the USDC to the contract 0x9A47f3289794E9bbc6a3C571f6D96Ad4E7bAED16 (0x945e60e35b130546d7d6805f88e6c3a049958342995b06f1bd1225825c276b74); onward path not traced. |
T7.003 |
| 2026-11-12 14:00:47 | 0xbb5ce35d3e307da88f74e32d28906f05d12ca2cf1faeef646f9c854f69e3323f: the attacker calls bridge on MetaBridge 0x0439e60F02a8900a951603950d8D4527f400C3f1 with 0.05 wstETH, which goes to the same contract 0x9A47f3289794E9bbc6a3C571f6D96Ad4E7bAED16; within that transaction the wstETH is split, swapped and passed on to other addresses. Final destination undisclosed. |
T7.003 |
| 2026-11-12 14:12 to 14:16 | The attacker receives 0.003907565135158029 WETH and unwraps it to ETH (0x259e51ede919db3f4e40b57f4c614f77aa3ac545bc12634053c35045c199634a). |
— |
| 2026-11-12 22:09 onward | The attacker sends token transfers of 5,006.133489 units labelled "USDC" (with non-standard characters in the token symbol) to several addresses that begin with 0xd492 and end with 9378, the same pattern as the real holding address. Those are not the USDC contract; this looks like address-poisoning bait and is an OAK observation, not a sourced claim. |
— |
| 2026-11-12 | The 101,000 YUNO is not moved by the attacker in the transfers OAK checked. | — |
| 2026-11-12 to 2026-11-13 | SlowMist issues a TI alert listing the Settlement contract and attacker and urges revocation; Lookonchain and RektRadar repeat it. RektRadar says no pause, patch or reimbursement announcement was found, and the contract was still live. No statement from Pennysia was located. | response |
Key addresses:
- Attacker EOA —
0x813A5aB666AdeBa907548235fbAc087642878300 - Attack contract —
0x96Bb89E3F86312968cE11A1bD8d9d28F4891a17A - Vulnerable contract (Pennysia Settlement V1) —
0x3Aad97E5a91b8e43b7Dc830aCEb004307678795E - Settlement deployer —
0xDa70eC0779aB1904B7eb6C32f308B1a1C163fCB8 - USDC holding address —
0xd492f207c2C2520Dcb13eD04AfA81aAae66C9378 - Contract receiving USDC and wstETH —
0x9A47f3289794E9bbc6a3C571f6D96Ad4E7bAED16 - Victims —
0xF2Ff84D45783BD64913903516FA44B419F266998,0x61081de92Ad52c786719537D84a4534A398bf76a,0x56EbC608fD6B8F8CeF2775a3Ee0DddaEc01A7000,0x40A86E910AB2E709cb552f6F8A979bc90D669497
Fund flow
All transfers as a table (15)
Root-cause evidence
- Technique: OAK-T9.004
- Source: https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2121135351377047735; https://www.rektradar.xyz/web3-daily-exploits-13-nov-2026-pennysia-5k-settlement-approval/; https://www.lookonchain.com/feeds/82046
- Source type: security-firm
- Confidence: reported
- Evidence: SlowMist: "The Settlement contract on Ethereum was exploited through an arbitrary external call, which let the attacker spend users' leftover token approvals." RektRadar and Lookonchain repeat SlowMist. The on-chain transfers match this picture (victims to Settlement to attack contract to attacker). Not established: the vulnerable function, whether the flaw was in the original deployment, and the operator's own account. Same-day third-party analysis, so not confirmed.
Public references
[slowmist2026pennysia]— SlowMist, TI alert on Pennysia Settlement (2026-11-13): https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2121135351377047735[rektradar2026pennysia]— RektRadar, "Web3 daily exploits 13 Nov 2026: Pennysia $5K Settlement approval": https://www.rektradar.xyz/web3-daily-exploits-13-nov-2026-pennysia-5k-settlement-approval/[lookonchain2026pennysia]— Lookonchain feed 82046: https://www.lookonchain.com/feeds/82046