Worked example · 2026-11
Pool Party — an attacker changed a recorded position in a pool's snapshot contract, deposited 10 USDC and withdrew the pool's funds, across 15 pools — Pool Party / Arbitrum and Base — 2026-11-13
Summary
Pool Party said on X that "between 01:34 and 03:38 UTC, an attacker drained 15 pools: 12 on Arbitrum and 3 on Base" on 2026-11-13, at about $215k total, and that pools on Polygon and Robinhood Chain were not affected. The post is timestamped 18:23:10 UTC on 2026-11-13. Earlier, at 18:13:27 UTC, Defimon relayed an on-chain message from the Pool Party team to the exploiter offering a 10% bounty. RektRadar (secondary) reports that a fix was deployed on all four chains the same day. The operator thread OAK could read carries no technical post-mortem. OAK traced the attacker's USDC movements on Arbitrum and Base (below): repeated 10 USDC outflows from the attacker followed by large USDC inflows from a few addresses, and one 202,705.465993 USDC transfer at 03:37:59 to a relay wallet.
Timeline (UTC)
Flaw (undisclosed when introduced) → Take (2026-11-13 01:34–03:38 per the operator; OAK's earliest USDC transfer on the attacker address is 01:36:30) → Money (relay wallet, then reported conversion toward XMR) → Response (bounty message, fix). All times 2026-11-13 and from the operator, Defimon or OAK's explorer pull; stated per row.
| When | What happened | OAK |
|---|---|---|
| Before 2026-11-13 01:34 (undisclosed) | Each pool has a snapshot contract recording user positions; the record could be altered in a way that inflated what the attacker could withdraw. Exact flaw and when deployed are undisclosed. | T9.016 |
| 2026-11-13 before 01:34 | No funding transaction for the attacker address was found by OAK in the pulled window (native-ETH sends were not listable; the RPC returned a state error). Attacker funding is undisclosed. | — |
| 2026-11-13 01:34–03:38 (operator window) | Attacker drains 15 pools: 12 on Arbitrum and 3 on Base. RektRadar's secondary tracer describes the loop Add Liquidity (10 USDC) → syncInvestor() → Withdraw. |
T9.016 |
| 2026-11-13 01:36:30 | First USDC transfer on the attacker address on Arbitrum (traced by OAK): 10.000592 USDC from 0x6f38e884725a116c9c7fbf208e79fe8828a2595f, tx 0x13fffc93cbcadc9f8a9ddd47150a31cd4c5d3371d543f966f7e67f3a1334ab40. At 01:37:46 the attacker sends 10 USDC to 0x90b5f4d2aeca515d368bb73e4b3cd4155dcb42d3, tx 0x6a4682d7def57a090ddab9f74b2611be6e7f14381cd89bc203e6f08aecde2250; the same 10 USDC pattern repeats many times. OAK did not decode these as pool calls. |
T9.016 |
| 2026-11-13 02:22:47 | Representative large payout on Arbitrum (traced by OAK): 72,050.680047 USDC from 0xc6962004f452be9203591991d15f6b388e09e8d0 to the attacker, tx 0xa871632b699a0bf53d4801662c9bd0bd93781b27afe8db3f9f81661251566e3b. That address paid the attacker in many transactions; no source names it as a Pool Party pool. |
T9.016 |
| 2026-11-13 03:15:35 | Representative Base payout (traced by OAK): 4,140.516045 USDC from 0xd0b53d9277642d899df5c87a3966a349a798f224 to the attacker, tx 0x23788769fc6200756b71e2c26ac9f09a0bebc691a047d7e04529105a4042fee7. |
T9.016 |
| 2026-11-13 03:34:21–03:34:23 | Base: attacker sends 12,026.219482 USDC to 0x50cfe7c1938db66a1a6d2e86d36f39fbef3d5c4a, tx 0xfea3550aae89039b8e48517bd8537400cbc4fe9be21e1e40cfff03f56e0ad720. Two seconds later on Arbitrum the attacker receives 11,996.153934 USDC from 0x8b5d51af4c4542f241c4e54cfd903ceed145f082, tx 0xa676217692dd76627b62608fc9eab33ab663c7e1230f51af957c836a5dbdc7fd. The timing and size suggest a cross-chain move of the Base proceeds; no source confirms it and OAK did not identify the bridge. |
T7.003 (inferred, unconfirmed) |
| 2026-11-13 03:37:59 | Exit on Arbitrum (traced by OAK): attacker sends 202,705.465993 USDC to the relay wallet 0x4bf62a3da5c8d8488bc7b5bb3856940c026a15ac named by RektRadar, tx 0xa42ce4bc063fde9ab2af3cbb0ede58cad599d9a90fa2fef8d5e1098846f28eae. Onward path from the relay is not traced by OAK; RektRadar says funds went toward XMR and cites a secondary tracer's USDC leg of $212,705 (a different figure from the transfer above). |
T7.005 (per RektRadar, untraced) |
| 2026-11-13 04:58 | Defimon: 0xd40b1c59f3f0f17203cb443fddd6b92c4734233b "received 115,056.36 DAI from CCE Cash", which "paid it with funds stolen in the Pool Party exploit" (citing an FBI IC3 report). Per the message, the recipient may be an ordinary counterparty; it is not stated to be the attacker. |
T7.002 (per Defimon) |
| 2026-11-13 18:13:27 | On-chain message from the Pool Party team to the attacker address: 10% bounty, return the rest to 0x524d0A20EDFD36adD3a5eF5f5939958dF098B149 within 24 hours, no legal action if returned; tx 0x991c1766f529d44de7700e06b7e219cd07612faae76b1c64eedfc6dcf195f950. |
response |
| 2026-11-13 18:23:10 | Pool Party discloses the incident on X (12 Arbitrum and 3 Base pools; Polygon and Robinhood Chain not affected). RektRadar reports the fix was deployed across all four chains the same day; OAK did not find that statement in the operator post it could read. | response |
| 2026-11-14 05:58:22 | Defimon relays a second on-chain message to 0xd40b1c59f3f0f17203cb443fddd6b92c4734233b, tx 0x7dee32d62b118e29865d1886b2dda5e64ba8594c6415195201434459ff431bc5, asking the owner to come forward. |
response |
Key addresses:
- Attacker (published by the operator) —
0x2075c17abbd077cf6406736bb7047ed446ab7f8f - Relay wallet (RektRadar; received 202,705.465993 USDC, traced by OAK) —
0x4bf62a3da5c8d8488bc7b5bb3856940c026a15ac - Base transfer destination (12,026.219482 USDC, traced by OAK) —
0x50cfe7c1938db66a1a6d2e86d36f39fbef3d5c4a - Recipient of DAI from CCE Cash (per Defimon; role unknown) —
0xd40b1c59f3f0f17203cb443fddd6b92c4734233b - Operator's bounty return address —
0x524d0A20EDFD36adD3a5eF5f5939958dF098B149 - Pool and snapshot contract addresses — undisclosed (not published in the sources read)
OAK's pull of the attacker's USDC transfers on Arbitrum (2026-11-13 01:36:30 to 04:20:04) sums to 203,010.47 USDC in and 203,010.47 out; the Base pull (01:00–05:00) shows about 12,056 USDC of larger inbound payouts. These do not add to the operator's $215k (and the Base proceeds appear to have been moved to Arbitrum, so would be double-counted); other assets, addresses or valuation differences are possible and unresolved.
Fund flow
All transfers as a table (4)
Only the representative payouts, the Base outflow and the exit are drawn. The onward path from the relay (reported toward XMR) is not traced by OAK.
Root-cause evidence
- Technique: OAK-T9.016
- Source: https://x.com/PoolParty_xyz/status/2121307902430359906; https://www.rektradar.xyz/web3-daily-exploits-14-nov-2026-poolparty-215k-snapshot/
- Source type: news
- Confidence: reported
- Evidence: The operator's post states the incident, the 15 pools, the window and the loss; it does not describe the mechanism in the text OAK read. The mechanism (per-pool snapshot contracts recording user positions; a changed recorded position, a 10 USDC deposit, then a withdrawal; sequence Add Liquidity →
syncInvestor()→ Withdraw) comes from RektRadar, which paraphrases the team and a secondary tracer on 2026-11-14. A same-day secondary source cannot make thisconfirmed. Unknown: the flawed function, why the record could be changed, whether the 15 pools share one contract version, and the fix. No operator post-mortem was found.
Public references
[poolparty2026x]— Pool Party (@PoolParty_xyz), "Security incident at Pool Party" (2026-11-13): https://x.com/PoolParty_xyz/status/2121307902430359906[defimon2026bounty]— Defimon (@DefimonAlerts), relay of on-chain bounty message (2026-11-13): https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2121305457885053280[defimon2026cce]— Defimon (@DefimonAlerts), on-chain message on CCE Cash DAI payout (2026-11-14): https://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2121482855398215788[rektradar2026pp]— RektRadar, "Web3 Daily Exploits — 14 Nov 2026: Pool Party ~$215K Snapshot" (2026-11-14): https://www.rektradar.xyz/web3-daily-exploits-14-nov-2026-poolparty-215k-snapshot/