Worked example · 2026-11

Premia V3 — underwriter vaults wrote options into attacker-deployed empty pools and locked their own collateral there, where the attacker withdrew it — Premia V3 underwriter vaults / Arbitrum — 2026-11-01

Loss: ~$464.6K per PeckShield ("exploited for $464.6K"; Sprunky repeats $464,600). Blockaid's first alert, at 04:13 UTC, counted ~$400.5K "drained from the vaults so far across ~2 txs" with the attack "still ongoing"; GoPlus says "over $400,000". The exact total is not published by Premia. Per GoPlus, six vault contracts were affected. The two exploit transactions are one second apart. The exploiter bridged the funds from Arbitrum to Ethereum, then swapped to BTC via Chainflip and NEAR Intents (PeckShield). No funds returned at last report; no Premia statement found (see What is not known).
OAK Techniques observed: OAK-T9.004 (Access-Control Misconfiguration, counterfeit-object acceptance — primary, per GoPlus. Premia V3 option pools are created permissionlessly through a factory. The underwriter vaults, when a buyer traded with them, locked collateral into the matching pool without checking that the pool was a market worth trusting: GoPlus says the vault "checks only whether the pool was deployed by the official factory" and not "its liquidity, age, or whether it is an empty pool controlled exclusively by the attacker". The attacker deployed six empty pools, so the vault's collateral landed in a pool where the attacker was the only participant, and the pool's liquidity path paid it out. See techniques/T9.004-access-control-misconfiguration.md). OAK-T9.002 (Flash-Loan-Enabled Exploit — the Balancer Vault flash-loaned the WBTC, WETH, USDC and ARB that funded each sequence; traced by OAK). OAK-T7.003 (Cross-Chain Bridge Laundering — Arbitrum to Ethereum, then to BTC via Chainflip and NEAR Intents, per PeckShield; not traced by OAK).
Attribution: pseudonymous (exploiter EOA 0xbeBa8CEfD0D75d747C5AD966Dc17C0Bb60D84dBd; no one has attributed it to a named actor).
Key teaching point: A vault that writes into a market must check that the market is one it should trust, not only that it came from the official factory. When pool creation is permissionless, "deployed by our factory" proves nothing about liquidity, age or who controls the pool. A minimum-liquidity or age gate, or an allowlist of pools the vault may fund, would have stopped the vault from sending its collateral into a pool the attacker had created seconds earlier.

Summary

On 2026-11-01 at about 03:15 UTC the attacker used one contract to create six empty Premia V3 option pools, then sent two exploit transactions one second apart. In each, a flash loan funded a small option purchase; the underwriter vault followed its normal write path and locked collateral into the attacker's empty pool; the attacker, the only participant, withdrew that collateral through the pool's liquidity functions and repaid the flash loan. Blockaid flagged the attack at 04:13 UTC, PeckShield put the loss at $464.6K at 05:05 UTC, and GoPlus published a 13-part breakdown on 2026-11-02. The funds were bridged to Ethereum and swapped to BTC. Premia has published no statement that OAK could find.

Timeline (UTC)

Read it as four stages. Flaw: vaults fund any factory-made pool. Preparation: six empty pools are created. Take: two flash-loan transactions move vault collateral into those pools and out to the attacker. Money and response: bridge to Ethereum, swap to BTC; alerts. Transaction times were traced by OAK on Arbitrum; alert times are from the X posts.

When	What happened	OAK
Before 2026-11-01 (since when: undisclosed)	The factory lets anyone deploy an option pool for a given pair, strike, expiry and option type. The underwriter vaults write options into a pool by locking collateral there and, per GoPlus, do not check the pool's liquidity, age or whether the attacker alone controls it.	T9.004
2026-11-01 03:14:37	Preparation: the exploiter EOA calls the attack contract in `0xe3c263fcae544954367998e48e13112875cfd38a3b9a240e7818bb96313831f5`, sending 0.01 ETH; GoPlus says this creates the six option pools. The tx shows dust-sized seed transfers (under 14 tokens in total) into six pool addresses. How the 0.01 ETH was funded is undisclosed.	T9.004
2026-11-01 03:15:39	First exploit tx `0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac`: flash-borrows 0.9 WBTC, 11 WETH and 6,000 USDC from the Balancer Vault. For the pSV-WBTC/USDCe-C vault `0x45dF5EA836A15B561937Ae8373ab9eE984aea531` the buyer pays a 0.11714618 WBTC premium, and the vault sends 3.76125 WBTC into the empty pool `0x1B25F69Cfc2b3A9fCC0A7C0944A81723d5dcD77d`. The pool then sends 4.4904 WBTC to the attack contract. The WETH vault `0xbae43c546DFADC69576aE73C68e0694A54F08e1B` and the USDC put vault `0xD46993F25D298ebbCD31E941156C66f7e628A52a` are drained the same way, and all flash loans are repaid in the same tx.	T9.004, T9.002
2026-11-01 03:15:40	Second exploit tx `0xd7e8086df0570c5389ca27eb9bcdff290e810c094155b410a42e5bad2b3244ff`: flash-borrows 12,000 ARB, 5,500 USDC and 4,000 USDC from the Balancer Vault and repeats the pattern against the ARB call and put vaults (GoPlus) and further USDC vaults; the vaults send USDC and ARB into attacker pools, which pay the attack contract. The attack contract swaps the proceeds within the tx (it unwraps 148.53702309 WETH).	T9.004, T9.002
2026-11-01 04:13:20	Blockaid detects the exploit as "ongoing": "~$400.5k drained from the vaults so far across ~2 txs".	—
2026-11-01 (time undisclosed), by 05:05:03	The exploiter bridges the stolen funds from Arbitrum to Ethereum, then swaps them to BTC via Chainflip and NEAR Intents (PeckShield). OAK could not trace this leg: native ETH sends are not visible over public RPC and the Arbitrum Blockscout API refused the lookup.	T7.003
2026-11-01 05:05:03	PeckShield reports the loss as $464.6K.	—
2026-11-01 07:05	Sprunky repeats the $464,600 figure and lists the exploiter EOA, the exploit contract and a "helper contract".	—
2026-11-02 09:46	GoPlus publishes a 13-part root-cause breakdown with the six affected vaults and the three attack transactions.	—
Not published	Pause of the vaults, fix, statement, refunds or bounty: undisclosed.	response

Key addresses:

Exploiter EOA — 0xbeBa8CEfD0D75d747C5AD966Dc17C0Bb60D84dBd
Exploit (attack) contract — 0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f
"Helper contract" per Sprunky; on-chain it receives USDC from a vault in the second tx, like the attacker-created pools — 0x1E3aDD9C06459c069E31dB7D67e0105f2D389128
Empty pool used in the first example (WBTC) — 0x1B25F69Cfc2b3A9fCC0A7C0944A81723d5dcD77d
Affected vaults (GoPlus): 0x45dF5EA836A15B561937Ae8373ab9eE984aea531, 0xbae43c546DFADC69576aE73C68e0694A54F08e1B, 0x6A1FC0E1c60BA6564CDe4910A425F1F1a1d18C1F, 0xDC631d88dbB5eb39f5c4Bf8B4e5298d098912fFf, 0xD46993F25D298ebbCD31E941156C66f7e628A52a, 0xBe3E229319f86f5ee96ee1dc0b6d55e8b68a439e
Fee recipient seen in both txs (GoPlus: consistent with a 0.3% fee, short form 0x7bf2392b…) — 0x7bf2392bd078c8353069cffeacc67c094079be23
Flash-loan source — Balancer Vault 0xba12222222228d8ba445958a75a0704d566bf2c8
BTC addresses, bridge and swap transactions — not published in the cited sources

Fund flow

Arbitrum leg, traced by OAK with tools/explorer.py on 2026-11-03 from the transfer logs of the two exploit transactions. Edges marked verified: oak were read from those logs. Native ETH movements are not visible over public RPC, and the Arbitrum Blockscout address API refused the lookup, so the Arbitrum-to-Ethereum bridge and the swap to BTC are relayed from PeckShield and carry no addresses. Only the largest vault-to-pool and pool-to-attacker legs are listed; the other vaults in each tx follow the same pattern. Pool-to-attacker amounts include the attacker's own deposits and the flash-loaned premium (GoPlus: "the attacker also recovered their own deposits"), so they are not net loss.

All transfers as a table (11)

Time (UTC)	From	To	Amount	OAK	Tx	Basis
2026-11-01T03:14:37Z	Exploiter EOA `0xbeBa8CEfD0D75d747C5AD966Dc17C0Bb60D84dBd`	Exploit contract `0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f`	0.01 ETH	T9.004	`0xe3c263fcae544954367998e48e13112875cfd38a3b9a240e7818bb96313831f5`	traced by OAK
2026-11-01T03:15:39Z	Balancer Vault (flash loans) `0xba12222222228d8ba445958a75a0704d566bf2c8`	Exploit contract `0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f`	0.9 WBTC	T9.002	`0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac`	traced by OAK
2026-11-01T03:15:39Z	pSV-WBTC/USDCe-C vault `0x45dF5EA836A15B561937Ae8373ab9eE984aea531`	Attacker-created empty WBTC pool `0x1B25F69Cfc2b3A9fCC0A7C0944A81723d5dcD77d`	3.7613 WBTC	T9.004	`0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac`	traced by OAK
2026-11-01T03:15:39Z	Attacker-created empty WBTC pool `0x1B25F69Cfc2b3A9fCC0A7C0944A81723d5dcD77d`	Exploit contract `0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f`	4.4904 WBTC	T9.004	`0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac`	traced by OAK
2026-11-01T03:15:39Z	Premia WETH vault `0xbae43c546DFADC69576aE73C68e0694A54F08e1B`	Attacker-created empty WETH pool `0xaf0dda38064f4fa44577eba22f8f9e2cbcb038ac`	45.135 WETH	T9.004	`0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac`	traced by OAK
2026-11-01T03:15:39Z	Attacker-created empty WETH pool `0xaf0dda38064f4fa44577eba22f8f9e2cbcb038ac`	Exploit contract `0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f`	53.88 WETH	T9.004	`0x64602cbbeba5d3c7a5e2cff4f98cc118886fc6051c56fa50458abec2c90441ac`	traced by OAK
2026-11-01T03:15:40Z	Balancer Vault (flash loans) `0xba12222222228d8ba445958a75a0704d566bf2c8`	Exploit contract `0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f`	12,000 ARB	T9.002	`0xd7e8086df0570c5389ca27eb9bcdff290e810c094155b410a42e5bad2b3244ff`	traced by OAK
2026-11-01T03:15:40Z	Premia ARB vault `0xDC631d88dbB5eb39f5c4Bf8B4e5298d098912fFf`	Attacker-created empty ARB pool `0xc25b7a212327d45deb2022dbb1d57e1217a82d8e`	48,144 ARB	T9.004	`0xd7e8086df0570c5389ca27eb9bcdff290e810c094155b410a42e5bad2b3244ff`	traced by OAK
2026-11-01T03:15:40Z	Attacker-created empty ARB pool `0xc25b7a212327d45deb2022dbb1d57e1217a82d8e`	Exploit contract `0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f`	57,480 ARB	T9.004	`0xd7e8086df0570c5389ca27eb9bcdff290e810c094155b410a42e5bad2b3244ff`	traced by OAK
2026-11-01T05:05:03Z	Exploit contract `0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f`	Arbitrum to Ethereum bridge (undisclosed)	stolen funds (ETH-denominated, amount undisclosed)	T7.003		per `peckshieldpremia2026`
2026-11-01T05:05:03Z	Arbitrum to Ethereum bridge (undisclosed)	Chainflip / NEAR Intents swap to BTC (undisclosed)	bridged funds swapped to BTC (amount undisclosed)	T7.003		per `peckshieldpremia2026`

What the trace adds beyond the sources:

Flash-loan source. Both exploit transactions borrow from the Balancer Vault 0xba12222222228d8ba445958a75a0704d566bf2c8 and repay it inside the same tx (for example 0.9 WBTC out and 0.9 WBTC back in the first tx).
Pool creation. The first tx (03:14:37) is the only one before the exploit pair. It shows seed transfers into six pool addresses that later receive vault collateral: 0x1B25F69Cfc2b3A9fCC0A7C0944A81723d5dcD77d, 0xaf0dda38064f4fa44577eba22f8f9e2cbcb038ac, 0xb97235483bbe8086ed5f054800023aedab76000a, 0x1e3add9c06459c069e31db7d67e0105f2d389128, 0xc25b7a212327d45deb2022dbb1d57e1217a82d8e and 0x3b38b22c64a90d342449c5b107e315daa7e3b73d. So 0x1E3aDD9C06459c069E31dB7D67e0105f2D389128 is an attacker-created pool, not a separate helper, in the transfer logs.
Match with GoPlus. The 3.76125 WBTC vault-to-pool and 4.4904 WBTC pool-to-attack-contract figures in GoPlus match the chain. The log also shows 0.0112524 WBTC from the pool to 0x7bf2392bd078c8353069cffeacc67c094079be23.
In-transaction exit. The first tx unwraps 43.23849768 WETH and the second 148.53702309 WETH (transfers to the zero address). The proceeds therefore left the exploit contract as native ETH, which this tool cannot show.
Limits. The bridge and BTC legs, the exploiter's later balances and any BTC destination are not traced.

Root-cause evidence

Technique: OAK-T9.004
Source: https://x.com/GoPlusSecurity/status/2117191582361555366; https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2116745378674463229
Source type: security-firm
Confidence: corroborated
Evidence: Two independent security firms describe the same mechanism. Blockaid (2026-11-01 04:13 UTC): the attacker "created empty option pools, flash-loaned, and bought options so vault collateral locked into those pools, then withdrew it as liquidity". GoPlus (2026-11-02) adds the vault-side flaw (factory-origin check only, no liquidity or age check) and the worked example, and OAK's reading of the transfer logs matches its amounts. This is third-party analysis of unverified contract behaviour: Premia has not confirmed the root cause, and the exact vault and pool functions that skip the check are not named in the sources, so the label stays below confirmed.

What is not known

Premia has published no statement that OAK could find. The official account was not located: the @PremiaLabs handle named in the alerts posts about a different product. The confirmed root cause, fix and any compensation are undisclosed.
The final loss: PeckShield $464.6K, Blockaid $400.5K mid-attack, GoPlus "over $400,000".
GoPlus part 4 is cut off in the API response and part 11 was not returned, so some detail of the withdrawal steps is missing.
The exact vault code path that accepts the empty pool, whether the vaults were paused, and the BTC destination addresses.

Public references

[blockaidpremia2026] — Blockaid on X, Premia exploit alert (2026-11-01): https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2116745378674463229
[peckshieldpremia2026] — PeckShield on X, Premia loss and laundering path (2026-11-01): https://x.com/PeckShieldAlert/status/2116758393067340132
[sprunkypremia2026] — Sprunky on X, attacker infrastructure map (2026-11-01): https://x.com/sprunky_eth/status/2116788691972599910
[goplusprem2026] — GoPlus Security on X, 13-part exploit breakdown (2026-11-02): https://x.com/GoPlusSecurity/status/2117191582361555366