oak_techniques: [OAK-T1.003]
spec_id: oak-detection-T1.003
version: 0.1.0
maturity: stable
maintainer: "@iZonex"
license: Apache-2.0

scope: |
  Detect contracts whose surface-level renouncement claim (Ownable
  `owner() == 0x0`) is not bound to the full authority surface — proxy
  admin slot, beacon, AccessControl roles, or dependency contracts
  retain privileged authority. Excludes: T1.001 (mutable fees with
  acknowledged authority); T6.001 (source-bytecode mismatch — frequently
  combined, separate Technique); legitimate timelock-gated upgrade
  authority (suppressed via `timelock_allowlist`).

data_sources: [contract_bytecode, contract_storage, contract_events,
               authority_graph, simulation_environment, funder_graph]

detection_logic:
  description: |
    Five orthogonal paths. PATH A (static authority enumeration): any
    non-owner authority surface non-empty after surface renouncement.
    PATH B (bytecode-diff): deployed runtime contains authority-mutating
    selectors absent from verified source. PATH C (continuous): privileged
    event after `OwnershipTransferred(_, 0x0)`. PATH D (simulation):
    privileged tx from residual authority succeeds in fork. PATH E
    (cluster): deployer cluster reuses the pattern across deployments.
  pseudocode: |
    EIP1967_ADMIN  = 0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103
    EIP1967_IMPL   = 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc
    EIP1967_BEACON = 0xa3f0ad74e5423aebfd80d3ef4346578335a9a72aeaee59ff6cb3582b35133d50

    # PATH A — static authority-graph enumeration
    if eth_call(C, "owner()") == 0x0:
      residual ← {}
      a ← getStorageAt(C, EIP1967_ADMIN);   if a ≠ 0: residual += {proxy_admin: a}
      b ← getStorageAt(C, EIP1967_BEACON);  if b ≠ 0: residual += {beacon: b}
      for n in 0..getRoleMemberCount(C, DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE):
        residual += {default_admin: getRoleMember(C, DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, n)}
      for dep in dependency_contracts(C):           # fee, staking, governance
        if eth_call(dep, "owner()") ≠ 0x0: residual += {dep_owner: dep}
      residual_filtered ← residual − timelock_allowlist
      if residual_filtered ≠ ∅:
        emit(PATH_A, residual=residual_filtered, severity=high)

    # PATH B — bytecode-diff (verified-source contracts)
    if has_verified_source(C):
      canonical ← compile(verified_source(C))
      runtime  ← getCode(C)
      auth_selectors ← selectors_mutating(authority_state, runtime) −
                       selectors_mutating(authority_state, canonical)
      if auth_selectors ≠ ∅:
        emit(PATH_B, hidden_selectors=auth_selectors, severity=critical)

    # PATH C — continuous event monitoring
    on event Upgraded | RoleGranted | Initialized | AdminChanged on C:
      last_renounce ← last(OwnershipTransferred(_, 0x0) on C)
      if last_renounce ≠ None and event.block ≥ last_renounce.block:
        emit(PATH_C, event=event.name, tx=event.tx, severity=high)

    # PATH D — simulation matrix
    if simulation_available:
      for actor in {prior_owner(C)} ∪ residual.values():
        with chain_fork():
          ok ← as(actor): try_call(C, upgrade_or_setOwner_or_grantRole)
          if ok: emit(PATH_D, actor, severity=critical)

    # PATH E — deployer cluster reuse
    cluster ← funder_graph_cluster(deployer(C), hops = trace_hops)
    prior   ← contracts_deployed_by(cluster) - {C}
    hits    ← {p ∈ prior : matched_PATH_A_or_B(p)}
    if |hits| ≥ cluster_hit_threshold:
      emit(PATH_E, cluster_size=|cluster|, prior_hits=hits, severity=high)

parameters:
  timelock_allowlist:    { type: list,    default: [] }
  trace_hops:            { type: integer, default: 3 }
  cluster_hit_threshold: { type: integer, default: 1 }

output_alert: [oak_technique, detection_path, severity, contract_address,
               chain, residual_authority, evidence]

test_fixtures:
  positive:
    - 2023-06-chibi-finance-onlygov-arbitrum
    - 2023-08-magnate-finance-base-deployer-cluster
    - 2022-01-frosties
    - 2021-2026-influencer-amplified-non-memecoin-rug-cohort
  negative:
    - "Compound / Aave / Uniswap governance — non-renounced but timelock-gated, suppressed via timelock_allowlist"
    - "Truly-immutable non-proxy ERC-20 (e.g., USDC implementation slot owned by canonical proxy admin allowlisted)"

false_positive_modes:
  - legitimate timelocked upgrade authority (canonical timelock_allowlist)
  - emergency-pause guardian retained intentionally (binary pause, not authority over economic params)
  - multisig-held DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE that is itself the renouncement target (operational lag)
  - beacon proxy where the beacon owner is a canonical, allowlisted governance contract

mitigations: [OAK-M01, OAK-M02, OAK-M03, OAK-M05, OAK-M16, OAK-M17, OAK-M22, OAK-M25, OAK-M32, OAK-M40]

reference_implementations:
  - { target: slither-plugin,    chain: evm, url: "" }
  - { target: forta-bot,         chain: evm, url: "" }
  - { target: tenderly-virtualnet, chain: evm, url: "" }
  - { target: dune,              chain: evm, url: "" }
  - { target: mg-detectors-rs,   chain: evm, url: "" }