oak_techniques: [OAK-T14.003] spec_id: oak-detection-T14.003 version: 0.1.0 maturity: emerging maintainer: "@iZonex" license: Apache-2.0 scope: | Detect restaking-protocol cascading risk where the same staked assets simultaneously secure multiple AVSs, an LRT wraps restaked stake, or a small operator set concentrates AVS coverage. Four sub-cases: (a) AVS-design slashing-cascade; (b) LRT depeg cascade (refined sub-class detection in T14.003.001); (c) operator concentration risk; (d) slashing-as-economic-attack. Detection is primarily pre-event surface inventory plus runtime cascade monitoring. Excludes: T14.001 (single-validator slashing — composes as ignition); T14.002 (relay attack); single-AVS contract bugs (T9-class); legitimate high-TVL AVS without operator-overlap concentration. data_sources: [restaking_protocol_state, avs_registry, operator_registry, lrt_state, lending_market_state, oracle_feed, slashing_event_log, funder_graph] detection_logic: description: | Five orthogonal paths. PATH A (per-operator AVS concentration): operator secures > avs_concentration of stake-weight or > N AVSs. PATH B (cross-AVS shared-stake graph): connected component of AVSs sharing operators carries > component_tvl in cumulative TVL. PATH C (LRT depeg propagation): LRT/ETH peg deviates beyond band correlated with underlying slashing or oracle disagreement. PATH D (lending-market LRT exposure): liquidation-cascade-size estimate for n% LRT depeg exceeds protocol's solvency margin. PATH E (slashing event causes cross-AVS shrinkage): a slash on AVS-A reduces the security budget of AVS-B / C below the published threshold via shared operator stake. pseudocode: | # PATH A — per-operator AVS concentration for each operator O in operator_registry: avss ← avss_secured_by(O) stake_share ← Σ avs_stake(a, O) / total_stake(a) for a in avss max_share ← max(stake_share) if |avss| > avs_count_max or max_share > avs_concentration: emit(PATH_A, operator=O, avs_count=|avss|, max_share, severity=high) # PATH B — cross-AVS shared-stake graph G ← graph(nodes = avs_registry, edges = {(a,b, shared_stake_fraction(a,b)) for a, b in pairs(avs_registry) if shared_stake_fraction(a, b) > shared_stake_floor}) for c in connected_components(G): cum_tvl ← Σ tvl_usd(a) for a in c if cum_tvl > component_tvl_floor: emit(PATH_B, component_avss=c, cumulative_tvl_usd=cum_tvl, severity=high) # PATH C — LRT depeg propagation for each LRT L: peg ← lrt_eth_price(L) / redemption_rate(L) window_holds ← all(|peg(t) − 1| > peg_band for t in last(peg_window)) slash_in_window ← ∃ slashing on underlying(L) in last(peg_window) if window_holds and (slash_in_window or oracle_disagreement(L)): emit(PATH_C, lrt=L, current_peg=peg, slash_correlated=slash_in_window, severity=critical) # PATH D — lending-market LRT cascade-size estimate for each lending market M: lrt_collat ← {(asset, amount) for (asset, amount) in collateral(M) if asset.kind == LRT} for depeg in [0.05, 0.10, 0.20]: cascade ← estimate_liquidation_cascade(M, depeg, lrt_collat) if cascade > M.solvency_margin × cascade_margin_factor: emit(PATH_D, market=M, depeg, cascade_usd=cascade, severity=high) # PATH E — slashing → cross-AVS shrinkage on slashing s on AVS A and operator O: affected ← avss_secured_by(O) − {A} for B ∈ affected: before ← B.security_budget after ← before − stake_attributable(O, B) × s.fraction if after < B.published_security_threshold: emit(PATH_E, source_avs=A, affected_avs=B, before, after, operator=O, severity=critical) parameters: avs_count_max: { type: integer, default: 8 } avs_concentration: { type: number, default: 0.30 } # > 30% of any AVS stake shared_stake_floor: { type: number, default: 0.10 } component_tvl_floor: { type: number, default: 1000000000 } # $1B peg_band: { type: number, default: 0.01 } # 1% off-peg peg_window: { type: duration, default: 6h } cascade_margin_factor: { type: number, default: 1.5 } output_alert: [oak_technique, detection_path, severity, chain, operator, avs_count, component_avss, cumulative_tvl_usd, lrt, peg, market, cascade_usd, evidence] test_fixtures: positive: - 2024-eigenlayer-restaking-airdrop # AVS slashing-condition cohort context - 2024-04-renzo-ezeth-depeg # LRT depeg propagation (refined in T14.003.001) - 2025-07-lido-steth-aave-cascade # cross-asset cascade context negative: - "AVS using Unique Stake Allocation (operator stake earmarked per AVS — cross-AVS shrinkage cannot fire)" - "LRT with redemption-rate-aware oracle and depeg < peg_band" - "Lending market with LRT cap below cascade_margin_factor × solvency" false_positive_modes: - operators with high AVS count but Unique Stake Allocation (each AVS slashes only its own earmarked stake) — PATH A should consider stake-isolation primitives - peg deviation during legitimate market dislocation without underlying slashing — PATH C requires correlation with slash or oracle disagreement - PATH D estimates with conservative liquidity assumptions (calibrate via realistic cascade dynamics; lower-bound the estimate) - shared-stake edges through operator-cluster aggregation rather than true protocol-level overlap (require shared_stake_fraction at the protocol layer, not at the operator-cluster layer) mitigations: [OAK-M09, OAK-M11, OAK-M16, OAK-M17] reference_implementations: - { target: gauntlet, chain: ethereum, url: "" } - { target: chaos-labs, chain: ethereum, url: "" } - { target: steakhouse, chain: ethereum, url: "" } - { target: l2beat-restaking, chain: ethereum, url: "" } - { target: dune, chain: ethereum, url: "" }