oak_techniques: [OAK-T9.006.001]
spec_id: oak-detection-T9.006.001
version: 0.1.0
maturity: emerging
maintainer: "@iZonex"
license: Apache-2.0

scope: |
  Detect direct corruption of the subjective-oracle layer by tokenholders
  with material positions in the adjudicated market. Voter-bettor
  identity overlap drives resolution against the underlying real-world
  signal. Excludes: T9.006.002 (spec ambiguity — voters cite a reasonable
  interpretation, not "vote against criteria"); T9.003 (protocol-
  governance, not oracle-resolution); legitimate disputed resolutions
  where the public information state genuinely supported the divergent
  outcome (calibrate via media_consensus signal).

data_sources: [oracle_vote_logs, prediction_market_positions,
               token_holder_graph, off_chain_news_corpus]

detection_logic:
  description: |
    Three orthogonal paths. PATH A (voter–bettor overlap): top-N
    resolution voters hold material bettor-side positions on the
    adjudicated market. PATH B (whale concentration): single voter or
    small cluster captures > vote_concentration of resolution weight
    on a high-volume market. PATH C (media divergence): oracle
    resolution diverges from media consensus on the underlying claim
    by > divergence_threshold.
  pseudocode: |
    # PATH A — voter–bettor identity overlap
    for each disputed market M at resolution time t:
      voters ← top_n_voters(M.oracle, M.resolution_round, n = top_n)
      for each v in voters:
        bettor_pos ← position_value_usd(v.address, M)
        if bettor_pos > min_position_usd
           and aligned(v.vote_choice, sign(bettor_pos)):
          emit(PATH_A, market=M, voter=v.address,
               vote_weight=v.weight, bettor_pos_usd=bettor_pos,
               severity=critical)

    # PATH B — whale / cluster vote concentration
    for each resolution round R on market M:
      cluster ← funder_graph_cluster(voters_in(R), hops = trace_hops)
      max_share ← max(weight_of(c) / total_weight(R) for c in clusters(R))
      if max_share > vote_concentration
         and adjudicated_volume_usd(M) > min_market_volume_usd:
        emit(PATH_B, market=M, top_cluster_share=max_share,
             market_volume_usd=adjudicated_volume_usd(M),
             severity=critical)

    # PATH C — oracle vs media-consensus divergence
    for each resolved market M:
      consensus ← media_consensus(M.claim, sources = consensus_sources,
                                   window = pre_resolution_window)
      if consensus ≠ None
         and disagreement(M.outcome, consensus) > divergence_threshold:
        emit(PATH_C, market=M, oracle_outcome=M.outcome,
             media_consensus=consensus, sources_count=|consensus.sources|,
             severity=high)

parameters:
  top_n:                     { type: integer, default: 10 }
  min_position_usd:          { type: number,  default: 10000 }
  vote_concentration:        { type: number,  default: 0.20 }    # > 20% of vote
  min_market_volume_usd:     { type: number,  default: 1000000 }
  trace_hops:                { type: integer, default: 3 }
  consensus_sources:         { type: list,    default: [reuters, ap, afp, bbc] }
  pre_resolution_window:     { type: duration, default: 7d }
  divergence_threshold:      { type: number,  default: 0.7 }     # 70% sources disagree with oracle

output_alert: [oak_technique, detection_path, severity, market,
               oracle, voter_or_cluster, share, evidence]

test_fixtures:
  positive:
    - 2025-03-polymarket-uma-ukraine-mineral-deal       # single whale ~25% vote, no real-world deal
    - 2025-07-polymarket-zelenskyy-suit                 # top-10 voters ~30% / multi-source media consensus
  negative:
    - "Polymarket Trump-2024-election-winner market — UMA vote aligned with media consensus, no concentration"
    - "Disputed market where the disputed outcome later proved correct (genuine new-information resolution)"

false_positive_modes:
  - long-term UMA delegates whose voting weight on many markets exceeds the threshold but whose pattern is non-strategic — calibrate via per-voter aligned-vs-bettor-position rate over time
  - markets where the media-consensus signal is itself thin (< 3 sources) — require min |consensus.sources|
  - voters whose position originated post-vote (no bettor-side payoff at vote time) — require position established pre-vote
  - genuine ambiguity cases that should route to T9.006.002 — when voters cite a reasonable spec interpretation rather than vote-against-criteria

mitigations: [OAK-M02, OAK-M11, OAK-M16, OAK-M17]

reference_implementations:
  - { target: dune,                chain: polygon, url: "" }
  - { target: chainalysis-polymarket-surveillance, chain: polygon, url: "" }
  - { target: uma-voter-analytics, chain: ethereum, url: "" }